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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are creative, unpredictable, 
independent, autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of data 
collection, communicative, efficient, accurate, and have free choice 
among alternatives. Similar to humans, AI systems can 
autonomously create and generate creative works. The use of AI 
systems in the production of works, either for personal or 
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manufacturing purposes, has become common in the 3A era of 
automated, autonomous, and advanced technology. Despite this 
progress, there is a deep and common concern in modern society 
that AI technology will become uncontrollable. There is therefore a 
call for social and legal tools for controlling AI systems’ functions 
and outcomes. 
This Article addresses the questions of the copyrightability of 
artworks generated by AI systems: ownership and accountability. 
The Article debates who should enjoy the benefits of copyright 
protection and who should be responsible for the infringement of 
rights and damages caused by AI systems that independently produce 
creative works. Subsequently, this Article presents the AI Multi-
Player paradigm, arguing against the imposition of these rights and 
responsibilities on the AI systems themselves or on the different 
stakeholders, mainly the programmers who develop such systems.
Most importantly, this Article proposes the adoption of a new 
model of accountability for works generated by AI systems: the AI 
Work Made for Hire (WMFH) model, which views the AI system as a 
creative employee or independent contractor of the user. Under this 
proposed model, ownership, control, and responsibility would be 
imposed on the humans or legal entities that use AI systems and 
enjoy its benefits. This model accurately reflects the human-like 
features of AI systems; it is justified by the theories behind copyright 
protection; and it serves as a practical solution to assuage the fears 
behind AI systems. In addition, this model unveils the powers behind 
the operation of AI systems; hence, it efficiently imposes 
accountability on clearly identifiable persons or legal entities. Since 
AI systems are copyrightable algorithms, this Article reflects on the 
accountability for AI systems in other legal regimes, such as tort or 
criminal law and in various industries using these systems. 
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INTRODUCTION
The artist appraises the work, silently judging each stroke of 
dark ink on the canvas. Determining that the composition is not 
shaded quite right, the artist decides to switch to an even blacker hue. 
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Retrieving the brush from the palette, the artist begins to work again, 
methodically filling the canvas with terse, precise brushstrokes. This 
is a familiar scene, one that has been playing out in artists’ 
workshops from the medieval classic painters to modern creative 
artists. This artist, however, is different. It is a robot. Named e-David 
by its creators at the University of Konstanz in Germany, this robotic 
artist uses a complex visual optimization algorithm to create 
paintings.1 E-David represents merely one step in the ongoing
development of the complex, advanced, automated, autonomous, 
unpredictable, and evolving artificial intelligence (AI) systems that 
already create original intellectual property works.2
These AI systems are quite different from simple laser printers, 
which can only reproduce or copy existing works, in a predictable, 
structural method. E-David, on the other hand, unlike the traditional 
systems, can produce new drawings in a non-anticipated and creative 
way.3 E-David does not copy other works, but instead autonomously 
takes pictures with its camera and draws original paintings from 
these photographs. Some of these artworks might be entitled to 
1. See Oliver Deussen et al., Feedback-Guide Stroke Placement for a 
Painting Machine, in PROC. EIGHTH ANN. SYMP. ON COMPUTATIONAL AESTHETICS 
IN GRAPHICS, VISUALIZATION & IMAGING 25, 25, 27 (2012) (describing the e-
David painting machine, designed to simulate human painting processes, and 
the methods used by the developers in the Department of Computer and 
Information Science at the University of Konstanz, Germany). E-David has an 
arm, five brushes, a camera, a system of optimization via visual feedback, and 
a system of optimization strategy. See id.; see also Jason Falconer, e-David the 
Robot Painter Excels in Numerous Styles, NEW ATLAS (July 17, 2013), 
http://newatlas.com/edavid-robot-artist-painter/28310/ [http://perma.cc/R6DR-
44EM] (arguing that “[t]he line between art and technology isn’t just being
blurred, it’s being erased altogether”).
2. Falconer, supra note 1 (describing the artworks of e-David as 
composed of sketches from existing pictures as well as new ones taken with a 
camera). Relying on existing works might be considered an infringement of the 
copyright of the original works either directly or as creating derivative works. 
However, more sophisticated AI systems can create new artworks without 
copying or infringing copyrights of others. These systems are the focus of this 
Article. See, e.g., Harold Cohen, Driving the Creative Machine, ORCAS CTR.,
CROSSROADS LECTURE SERIES, 1, 3, 5, 7 (Sept. 2010), www.aaronshome.com/
aaron/aaron/publications/orcastalk2s.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ATB-
ALJP] (describing the AARON machine, which is another machine that creates 
abstract artworks); see also Harold Cohen, Fingerpainting for the 21st 
Century, AARONS HOME (Feb. 8, 2016), aaronshome.com/aaron/aaron/
publications/8Feb2016Fingerpainting-for-the-21st-Century-with-Figures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2J4-PVSK] (explaining the techniques and the process of 
developing the system).
3. See Falconer, supra note 1.
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copyright protection had humans created them. By using different 
techniques and an optimization system, e-David makes autonomous 
and unpredictable decisions about the image it is creating, the shapes 
and colors, the best way to combine light and shadow, and more.4
Even though e-David functions through software created by its 
programmers, a camera embedded in its complex system allows it to 
independently take new pictures and generate new creative input as 
“its own.” 
In this Article, I argue that under the “3A era” of automated, 
autonomous, and advanced technology, sophisticated AI systems and 
robots turn into talented authors. Indeed, these AI systems already 
function in the 3A era, generate products and services, make 
decisions, act, and independently create artworks. 
In 2016, nearly 400 years after the death of Rembrandt 
Harmenszoon van Rijn, the famous Dutch painter, a new Rembrandt, 
or rather The Next Rembrandt, was unveiled to the world.5 The goal 
of the project was to digitize the painting method of Rembrandt, the 
human painter.6 Once the program “learned” the style of the painter, 
it would create a new, creative, independent, and original work of art 
of the genuine Rembrandt.7 To ensure its success, the project brought 
together experts from a variety of fields—engineering, history, art—
4. Id. (describing how the software chooses what paint color and 
brush strokes are needed and how it can make up for inaccuracies in brush 
strokes and unpredictable paint mixing that occurs on the canvas).
5. Steve Schlackman, The Next Rembrandt: Who Holds the Copyright in 
Computer Generated Art, ART L.J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://artlawjournal.com/the-
next-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computer-generated-art 
[https://perma.cc/2C2R-EB5N] (discussing how the first “goal of the project was to 
discover if an algorithm could . . . produce a physical work of art that would mimic 
the look of a genuine Rembrandt painting”).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also The Next Rembrandt, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuygOYZ1Ngo&t=3s [https://perma.cc/
L4PR-NZNC]. 
To accomplish this lofty task, the team began with an in-depth
study of the proportions and features of the faces in Rembrandt’s 
works. To master his style, the project team “designed a software 
system that could understand Rembrandt based on his use of 
geometry, composition, and painting materials. A facial recognition 
algorithm identified and classified the most typical geometric patterns 
used by Rembrandt to paint human features. It then used the learned 
principles to replicate the style and generate new facial features for 
our painting.”
Schlackman, supra note 5.
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and transferred their knowledge into software capable of creating 
entirely new works of art.8
Once a work such as the new Rembrandt painting is created by 
an AI system, however, policy makers must re-consider the 
relevancy of the current laws. Can our legal system cope with 
questions of ownership and responsibility in the 3A era that have 
never been seen before?9 This discussion has deep roots in the 
copyright regime because AI systems are, ultimately, software 
algorithms that are regulated under the existing copyright law 
regime.10 I argue that one of the main challenges in the near future, 
the accountability of AI systems, may be solved through the use of 
copyright lens.11
AI systems and machine learning have already become part of 
our everyday life. One can already identify AI systems in unexpected 
regimes, such as: AI doctors,12 AI therapists,13 independent driverless 
8. See The Next Rembrandt, supra note 7.
9. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 3-35 (2011) 
(describing how the ownership of property rights means not only excluding others 
but also having accountability toward others regarding the right over the property 
and the use of the property); see also HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 104-28, 161-92 (2013) 
(disagreeing with the prevailing approach of private law in general and interprets the 
private law as reflecting horizontal relationships among citizens); Hanoch Dagan, 
The Challenges of Private Law: A Research Agenda for an Autonomy-Based Private 
Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67-87 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather 
& Ross Grantham eds., 2017) (advocating for private law as necessary to govern 
interpersonal relationships).
10. See Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, STAN. U. LIBR.,
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/faqs/copyright-ownership/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Y6E-ASJK] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous 
Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1366, 1375-86 (2016) (arguing that because 
autonomous weapons can independently and unpredictably select and engage 
targets—causing mass killings and damage—and because there is no individual to 
blame for reckless behavior, a new legal regime of tort laws should arise in the 
absence of other existing international tools); see also GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN 
ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 1-4 (2013) 
(discussing the accountability of robots for criminal offenses).
12. Jolene Creighton, AI Saves Woman’s Life by Identifying Her Disease 
When Other Methods (Human) Failed, FUTURISM (Aug. 5, 2016), 
http://futurism.com/ai-saves-womans-life-by-identifying-her-disease-when-other-
methods-humans-failed [https://perma.cc/8SWR-U9TD] (“If you needed proof that 
the age of artificial intelligence is officially upon us, well, look no farther. Reports 
assert [] that IBM’s artificial intelligence (AI) system, Watson, just saved the life of 
a Japanese woman by correctly identifying her disease. This is notable because, for 
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cars,14 AI lawyers,15 automated Alternative Dispute Resolution,16 and 
automated contracts.17 AI systems have also significantly influenced 
many other fields, such as investments,18 automated weapons,19
some time, her illness went undetected using conventional methods, and doctors 
were stumped.”).
13. See Jonathan Amos, Love Lab Predicts Marital Outcome, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2004, 9:20 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/
3484981.stm [https://perma.cc/ZFU7-Y69K] (discussing a mathematical model 
scientists believe can tell which marriages are doomed to end in divorce).
14. See David Szondy, University of Oxford Develops Low-Cost Self 
Driving Car System, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 18, 2013), http://newatlas.com/oxford-robot-
car/26282 [https://perma.cc/BU7S-6RGY]; see also Alexandru Budisteanu, Using 
Artificial Intelligence to Create a Low Cost Self-driving Car, BUDISTEANU,
http://budisteanu.net/Download/ISEF%202%20Autonomous%20car%20Doc%20par
ticle.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y46J-KSSA] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (discussing how 
a car that should be able to drive automatically and autonomously in an urban area is 
achievable). In 2004 road traffic caused 2.5 million deaths worldwide and 50 million 
injuries—87% of crashes were due solely to driver factors. Id. Most of the project’s 
components of self-driving cars have been done; the system is able to recognize the 
traffic signs and register them in a common database using Google maps, GPS, and 
more. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jessica Chasmar, Stanford Student’s Robot Lawyer Has 
Beaten 160,000 Parking Tickets, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/29/joshua-browder-stanford-
students-robot-lawyer-has-/ [https://perma.cc/X9CE-VESH] (describing a lawyer 
bot that won 160,000 cases); This Robot Lawyer Could Help You Get Your Parking 
Ticket Dismissed, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2016, 7:05 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/donotpay-bot-lawyer-helps-dismiss-parking-tickets-joshua-browder [https://
perma.cc/7REW-JWHC] (describing Stanford University freshman Joshua Browder 
and how the robot already saved drivers an estimated $4-5 million).
16. Chasmar, supra note 15.
17. Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH L. REV.
128, 133 (2017) (arguing that “[t]he existence of algorithms that must be understood 
as servants rather than mere tools justifies the creation and analysis of a distinct 
category called ‘algorithmic contracts,’” and that “[m]achine learning enables 
sophisticated algorithms to be more similar in function to a human employee with a 
task to achieve than a tool”).
18. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lexv-Aretz, Big Data and Social 
Netbanks: Are You Ready To Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 
1222 (2016) (showing that most financial institutes in North America are using 
big data analyses and banks are moving toward adopting technologies tools).
19. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1840-43, 1863-71, 1894-1901 (2015) 
(arguing that AI weapons “systems with varying levels of autonomy . . . have 
already integrated into the armed forces of numerous states” and calling for defining 
Autonomous Weapon System and regulating them internationally); see also Roberto 
Baldwin, The Robots of War: AI and the Future of Combat, ENGADGET (Aug. 18, 
2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/18/robots-of-war-ai-and-the-future-of-
combat [https://perma.cc/NPZ2-66VV] (arguing that “[t]he future of warfare will be 
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espionage,20 and even social policymaking.21 It is hard to imagine an 
area of study that has not been influenced by AI systems.
The AI industry has rapidly and consistently become an 
inevitable part of our present, and it is expected to further develop as 
the industry is estimated to grow to $70 billion by 2020.22 Although 
these systems are set to add substantial value to our world and bring 
about positive change, there are several drawbacks to these advanced 
filled with AI and robots [and] it’ll be a world where whoever builds the best 
artificial intelligent will emerge the victor”); Caitlin Brock, Where We’re Going, We 
Don’t Need Drivers: The Legal Issues and Liability Implications of Automated 
Vehicle Technology, 83 UMKC L. REV. 769, 770-73, 787-88 (2015) (arguing that 
the future of no driver reality is coming and the time to prepare is now); Ray 
Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 4, 2000), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,90538-2,00.html [https://
perma.cc/NK3R-29E8] (discussing issues raised by automated machines and the 
future of robots).
20. Jasper Hamill, Eyes in The Sky: CIA Training Artificial Intelligence 
to Spy on Earth from Space Using Computer Vision, THE SUN (Aug. 25, 2016, 
5:19 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1673802/cia-training-artificial-
intelligence-to-spy-on-earth-from-space-using-computer-vision 
[https://perma.cc/4Q67-4AWW].
21. Rob Kling, Automated Information Systems as Social Resources in 
Policy Making, ACM 666, 666 (1978), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=810109 
[https://perma.cc/C8HL-PTBS]. Automated information systems have been 
suggested by a number of theorists to aid public policy makers in acquiring 
more accurate, timely, and relevant information. 
This paper reports a study of the uses and impacts of automated 
systems for policy analysis in 42 municipal governments. 
Automated analyses are commonly used in municipal governments 
. . . and are used to support policy suggestions which are often 
implemented. Automated systems in these settings serve in both 
educational and political roles. 
See id. But see Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18-27) (arguing that a 
characteristic feature of the Algorithmic Society is that new technologies 
permit both public and private organizations to govern large populations. 
Behind robots, artificial intelligence agents, and algorithms are governments 
and businesses organized and staffed by human beings that exercise power 
over other human beings mediated through new technologies; therefore it is 
important to keep three rules: good faith; private owners’ fiduciary to the 
public; and transparency).
22. See Tech CEOs Declare This the Era of Artificial Intelligence,
FORTUNE (June 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/tech-ceos-artificial-
intelligence [https://perma.cc/K5KK-69C4] (discussing how “[t]ech companies 
are diving into AI analytics research, an industry that will grow to $70 billion 
by 2020 from just $8.2 billion in 2013” and that “[a]rtificial intelligence and 
machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and godlike that 
humans will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep up”).
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systems. Some of these drawbacks include, among other hazards, 
damage, suffering, and, most significantly, the loss of control. The 
main legal challenge remains: Who owns the products generated by 
AI systems and who is responsible for the possibly negative 
outcomes stemming from them?
Although diverse solutions have been proposed for dealing 
with the important issue of accountability for the works generated by 
autonomous AI systems, no one has yet seriously considered the 
solutions hidden within the paradigms embedded in the law of 
copyright. This Article proposes a new solution for dealing with the 
primary struggle regarding accountability of AI systems based on the 
copyright regime. The Article will address the fundamental 
intersection of AI systems and intellectual property laws. The Article 
proposes a solution taken from the copyright domain, one that might 
further influence the discussion of accountability for other products, 
such as autonomous cars and weapons, the drug industry, 
communication, and more. This relationship and the proposed 
solution (the new Model) have not been extensively discussed in the 
current literature. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, this 
Article will focus solely on the copyright regime. 
Are creative systems such as e-David and The Next Rembrandt 
a unique phenomenon within the copyright arena? Not at all. 
Interestingly, the AI industry has not skipped the creative and 
innovative production of intellectual property and especially 
copyrightable works. Paintings generated by AI systems are 
displayed in exhibitions worldwide.23 A scene in Ex-Machina, an 
independent thriller illustrating the power of AI, raises important 
questions of copyright law. In the movie, Ava, a humanoid robot, 
gives Caleb a drawing she has created for him as a gift to gain his 
love and his trust.24 Ava’s creative work was not a reproduction; it 
was an original piece of art that meets all the criteria for copyright 
protection, with the exception that it was created by an AI system.25
23. See for example the exhibition of Trevor Paglen, A Study of Invisible 
Images (Sept. 8–Oct. 21, 2017 at Metro Picture, Gallery, NYC, USA), 
http://www.metropictures.com/exhibitions/trevor-paglen4/ [https://perma.cc/3NCW-
B96F] (showing the spectacular exhibition of paintings made by one AI system—
the Generator/the painter—with the sophisticated feedback of another AI system—
the Discriminator/the trainer—after exchanging millions of examples between these 
two AI systems. This technique named Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) 
uses AI algorithms by implementing two neural networks used in unsupervised 
machine learning contesting each other).
24. EX MACHINA (Universal Pictures International 2015).
25. Id.
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However, copyright works created by AI systems are no longer just 
the stuff of science fiction movies.26 Automated machines, or AI-like 
systems, are already producing original works in almost every 
copyrightable medium, such as music,27 poetry,28 literature,29 news,30
and many others.31 Indeed, today it is almost impossible to imagine 
any kind of art developed without using at least some digital means. 
Eventually, automated systems will replace both creators and 
producers of numerous types of works, products, and services.
Following these latest developments, the legal challenge in the 
3A era is to decide who owns the copyright once an automated,
autonomous, and advanced machine, or any form of AI system, 
generates original and creative works independently of the humans 
who created the AI system itself.32 Subsequently, it is unclear who is 
entitled to the licensing rights to the product, who is entitled to the 
26. Brad Merrill, It’s Happening: Robots May Be the Creative Artists of the 
Future, MAKE USE OF (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/happening-
robots-may-creative-artists-future/ [https://perma.cc/8AY7-NPDA].
27. William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL 
Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281, 306 (2005) (“The question of 
whether machine-generated expression is a proper subject for copyright has been, 
and probably will continue to be, a subject of continued debate.”).
28. Samuel Gibbs, Google AI Project Writes Poetry Which Could Make 
Vogon Proud, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016, 7:01 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/17/googles-ai-write-poetry-
stark-dramatic-vogons [https://perma.cc/9938-ZASR] (discussing how Google, 
Stanford University, and others are working on an artificial intelligent program that 
will write poems after exposing the program to novels).
29. Alison Flood, Computer Programmed to Write Its Own Fables, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2014, 4:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/
06/computer-programmed-to-write-fables-moral-storytelling-system [https://
perma.cc/6FAC-RL9A] (discussing how a computer can write new and creative 
stories).
30. For more examples, see Lin Weeks, Media Law and Copyright 
Implications of Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67, 87 
(2014) (bringing examples of news created by machines and leave the questions 
regarding copyright issues open); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real 
Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gaining-traction.html 
[https://perma.cc/5SWH-M4RC].
31. Peter Kugel, Artificial Intelligence and Visual Art, 14 LEONARDO 137, 
137-39 (1981).
32. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, 
Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots, Driven by Artificial 
Intelligence Systems and the Originality Requirement: The Formality-Objective 
Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7-8 (arguing that robots that create unique 
artworks challenge the concept of originality within copyright law and 
recommending the adoption of a more formal and objective approach).
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royalties, and who bears responsibility for copyright infringement 
and protecting rights from infringements by others (humans or 
otherwise).33 Another challenge entails figuring out who is entitled to 
the moral right,34 if anyone should be at all.35 Should this one role-
player take it all or are many different stakeholders targeted?
Take, for example, The Next Rembrandt project. 
Approximately 350 paintings were analyzed and over 150 gigabytes 
of digitally rendered graphics were collected to provide the proper 
instruction set to produce the textures and layers necessary for The 
Next Rembrandt to have the painterly presence of an original work 
by the old master.36 Given the hard work involved, the number of 
people required, and the large monetary investment, one must 
wonder who bears the responsibility and accountability for these new
works generated by the AI system? Assuming the owner of the 
works (which differs from the owner of the AI system) is the most 
efficient entity to impose accountability on, who should be 
considered the owner?37 And which legal rights could he or she 
assert?38
This development re-imagines the whole concept of art and 
artists, and as such, it has resulted in the need to re-create the legal 
regime that governs art, especially artworks produced by AI 
systems.39 Intellectual property in general, and more specifically 
copyright laws, have become one of the most interesting, 
challenging, and contrasting fields demonstrating the unique features 
33. See id. at 6. 
34. Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception of 
Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218, 224 (2012); see generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, 
Rethinking Employees’ Intellectual Property Moral Rights: A New Model, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE (Miriam Bitton & Lior 
Zemer eds., 2012).
35. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 6-7.
36. Schlackman, supra note 5. See Amanda Levendowski, How 
Copyright Law Creates Biased Artificial Intelligence 3 (Mar. 16, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing AI is biased because AI 
needs vast amounts of good data, which is protected by copyright laws that 
only wealthy entities can afford).
37. See sources cited supra note 9.
38. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial 
Intelligence Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative Model for Patent 
Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 19-22) (arguing that the 
Multi-Players Model of AI systems places hurdles on entitling one human as the 
inventor in the case of AI systems produce inventions).
39. For more examples, see Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra
note 32, at 13-14.
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of advanced technology systems. AI systems can be characterized as 
creative, unpredictable, independent and autonomous, rational, 
evolving, capable of data collection and communication, efficient 
and accurate, and capable of exercising free choice among 
alternatives.40 AI systems are also confronting the traditional concept 
of looking for the human author behind the creation because the AI 
systems themselves may “replace” humans.41
Traditionally, intellectual property laws, and in particular 
copyright laws, have been based on human creators, who creatively, 
originally, and independently create works.42 But with the advent of 
AI systems, there is now the possibility that no human is behind the 
creative process. Instead, AI systems, as automated, autonomous, 
and advanced machines, create and produce works independently, 
unexpectedly, and creatively, with self-determination and an 
independent choice of what to create and how to create it. Even the 
wrong outcome, such as infringements of the rights of others or 
counterfeits, may be achieved independently, with no human to 
blame.43 This raises the pressing issue of whether the human or the 
AI system should be entitled to ownership rights. This tension
between art, creation, and AI systems is no longer a future concern 
or the topic of a science fiction movie, which is why it merits 
discussion.
This Article argues that the traditional laws of copyright are 
inadequate to cope with the new technology involved in creating
artworks. I further argue that products and services independently 
generated by machines challenge the justifications under IP and 
copyright laws, which rely on humans to create the works. Copyright 
laws are simply ill-equipped to accommodate this tech revolution 
and are therefore unlikely to survive in their current form. In order to 
address the change in the way art is being created, we must either 
rethink these laws, give them new meaning, or be ready to replace 
them.
This Article proposes a few alternative scenarios of the new 3A 
era in which AI systems are capable of generating independent 
works. After discussing the drawbacks of these scenarios, I propose 
adopting a new model based on a broader version of the Work Made 
40. Id. at 7 (describing the features of AI systems).
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (10th ed. 2016).
43. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1349, 1376-81 (stating the same 
argument in regards to autonomous weapons). 
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for Hire (WMFH) doctrine.44 I propose that AI systems should be 
seen as the creative employee or self-contractor creators working for 
or with the user—the firm, human, or other legal entity operating the 
AI system. On the one hand, this proposal reflects and maintains the 
human features of the AI system, such as independence, creativity, 
and intelligence. On the other hand, this proposal ensures that the 
employer or the user maintain the appropriate rights and duties, 
which include accountability for the outcomes of the AI system. This 
may be the best solution to the current problem of a lack of 
accountability for independent AI systems. Seeing the AI system 
through the copyright lens will provide new opportunities for 
imposing ownership and accountability on the known legal entities. 
Implementing a modified WMFH model may structure a feasible 
solution in the near future and impose responsibilities on the users 
who have affinities to the AI systems.
Part I of this Article will provide background on AI systems by 
discussing the different types of systems and their development over 
recent years. This Part will describe the features that make AI 
systems intelligent and creative and thus substitutes for human 
authors. Part II will address the question of who owns, and who takes 
the responsibility for, works created by AI systems. This Part 
presents two options. The first option is to see one of the humans or 
entities involved in the development of an AI system as the one who 
bears ownership and accountability for the outcomes of that system. 
The second option is to see the AI systems themselves as the digital, 
creative, and autonomous authors and hence the owners and the 
responsible entities for the works they produce. Part III will consider 
the various theoretical justifications for intellectual property 
protection. It will examine whether or not these theories lend any 
support or justification for these options or, alternatively, for a new 
option. Part IV will discuss the proposed model of AI systems, the 
WMFH model, and its implications for AI systems. Part V will 
discuss how U.S. copyright law is unprepared for the recent 
developments and challenges of AI systems, focusing primarily on 
the human authorship principle and extending copyright protection to 
works generated by automated creative AI systems. After 
determining that existing law is somewhat irrelevant and outdated, I
propose that the AI WMFH model can cure not only the 
inapplicability of current copyright law to new and advanced AI 
systems, but can also cure the desire to control these systems as well 
44. See infra Part III. 
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as to impose accountability on a legal known entity, such as the user 
of AI systems. By implementing the proposed model—one that sees 
AI systems as independent contractors or employees of the users and 
amending the law to accommodate the AI WMFH model—we can 
control the users of these systems, thus preventing situations in 
which the public loses control over the unknown outcomes of the AI 
systems. 
I. WHAT ARE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS? HISTORICAL 
AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVES
Before discussing the accountability of AI systems from a 
copyright perspective, one must address more basic questions: How 
does an AI system work? What does it mean that the system can 
autonomously create works? I argue that in order to address 
questions of accountability for AI systems, one must understand 
what lies beneath the mysterious concept of AI systems. This Part 
will clarify how automated AI systems function by focusing on one 
type of AI system that I have named the “pattern recognition” or 
“similarities identifier” AI system. This understanding is a
fundamental step before further discussion takes place concerning 
the accountability of AI systems from a copyright perspective.
A. The Different Kinds of AI Systems: The Old vs. The New and 
Advanced
AI algorithms vary significantly.45 A diverse array of AI 
algorithms has been developed to cover a wide variety of data and 
problems.46 This diversity of learning architectures and algorithms 
45. M.I. Jordan & T.M. Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, 
and Prospects, 349 SCI. MAG. 255, 255 (2015) (representing candidate programs, 
such as decision trees, mathematical functions, and general programming languages, 
and searching through these programs, such as optimization algorithms with well-
understood convergence guarantees and evolutionary search methods that evaluate 
successive generations of randomly mutated programs).
46. See generally TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME 
FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE,
AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009). See generally KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE 
LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE (2012) (offering “a comprehensive and 
self-contained introduction to the field of machine learning, based on a unified, 
probabilistic approach” and stressing a principled, model-based approach often 
using language of graphical models to specify models in a concise and intuitive 
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reflects the diverse needs of applications capturing different kinds of 
mathematical structures and offering different levels of amenability 
to post-hoc visualization and explanation. It provides varying trade-
offs between computational complexity, the amount of data, and 
performance.47
Defining AI systems is not an easy task. There are as many 
definitions as there are types of AI systems.48 John McCarthy, who 
coined the term “Artificial Intelligence,” did not provide an 
independent definition, while scholars Stuart Russell and Peter 
Norvig suggested almost ten different definitions.49 Definitions 
generally vary according to the targeted subject, emphasizing 
different aspects of AI systems.50 Based on its features, AI can be 
defined as a system capable of performing tasks that would normally 
require human intelligence, such as recognition, decision-making, 
creation, learning, evolving, and communicating.51 AI can also be 
way); Overview, MIT PRESS, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/machine-learning-0
[https://perma.cc/8K3F-BMCY] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
47. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 257 (arguing that large-scale deep 
learning systems have had a major effect in recent years in computer vision and 
speech recognition).
48. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 360 (2016) 
(describing how, unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be any widely accepted 
definition of AI even among experts, whose definitions vary widely and focus on 
myriad of ways AI systems are interconnected with human function—the ability to 
learn, or consciousness and self-awareness—which are difficult to define).
49. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 2-14, 1034 (3d ed. 2010) (describing definitions include 
thinking and acting humanly, as well as thinking and acting rationally; the definition 
is based on human features); see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 10-11
(listing different definitions of AI systems); What Is Artificial Intelligence?, JOHN 
MCCARTHY’S HOME PAGE (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/
whatisai/node1.html [https://perma.cc/4MF3-KJAH].
50. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 5-12 (discussing different 
approaches to AI, such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive math).
51. Id. at 14; see also MARCUS HUTTER, UNIVERSAL ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS BASED ON ALGORITHMIC PROBABILITY 125-
26, 231 (W. Brauer, G. Rozenberg & A. Salomaa eds., 2005) (arguing that AI 
system is a form of intelligence, as a result of features like creativity, problem 
solving, pattern recognition, classification, learning, induction, deduction, building 
analogies, optimization, surviving in an environment, language processing, and 
knowledge). Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence (last visited Jan. 
15, 2018) (“The theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks 
normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech 
recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.”).
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described as an instrument that can make existing solutions more 
efficient by using all data that is reachable by the AI system. Various 
contexts, such as medical treatments or chess strategies, also lead to 
different definitions of AI systems.52
Until recently, the “artificial intelligence” field was dominated 
by quasi-AI systems called “expert systems,” which mainly used a 
rules-based decision-making process.53 Put more simply, these 
systems were not fully autonomous and, therefore, not truly 
“intelligent.” They lacked the ability to learn and produce 
unpredictable results because they mostly acted in ways 
predetermined by their human-created programming.54 These 
systems could not evolve through learning. Consequently, they could 
not be truly creative because they could only “know” information 
that a human had placed in their “knowledge base.”55 Policy makers, 
nevertheless, still see these systems as the model of advanced 
technology. In many machines that create artworks, even though the 
software has some discretion in how to create the final composition, 
the scope of that discretion is limited to the operation of 
programming created by the human inventors.56 The significance of 
52. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 9 (describing why AI 
systems are intelligent).
53. Dana S. Rao, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An 
Examination of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in 
Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 509 (1997) 
(examining “whether U.S. patent law applies to software-implemented neural 
networks in light of recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, [as well as] analyz[ing] whether software networks can receive patent 
protection in the EC, based on Trade Related Intellectual Property Side (TRIPS) 
agreements and the Berne Convention, EC directives, Member-State statutes, and 
Member-State case law”). 
54. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 
Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1038-39 (1993) (addressing the claim that it will eventually be 
impossible to assimilate computer-generated works into the copyright system 
because they may have no obvious human author, and concluding not only that the 
case law contains no persuasive objection to extending copyright protection to these 
works, but also that such an extension would fulfill the constitutional imperative of 
promoting progress in these areas).
55. Id. (concluding that, despite arguments that incorporating new 
technologies into the current copyright system will lead to overprotection, the 
current regime is flexible enough to address concerns).
56. See e-David. A Painting Process, UNIVERSITÄT KONSTANZ (Apr. 24, 
2017) https://cms.uni-konstanz.de/informatik/edavid/news [https://perma.cc/UX4T-
XAAB] (describing the combination of human input and machine learning involved 
in the creation of the e-David painting robot).
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this from the copyright perspective is that human input is still 
necessary, not only for a work to be produced, but for it to have any 
sort of creative content. An expert system has become a tool for 
human creativity.57
Even though this type of quasi-AI system still exists, it does not 
represent the new standard of today, which is the focus of this study. 
AI technology has advanced rapidly. After working for decades on 
creating a new type of AI system, computer researchers have 
recently succeeded in creating a system that can ultimately have 
serious ramifications for copyright law.58 The current AI systems, 
functioning intelligently and using learning components 
autonomously, complicate the discussion. These systems are called 
“neural networks” because they mimic the function of human brains 
by absorbing and distributing their information processing capacity 
to groups of receptors that function like neurons; they find and create 
connections and similarities within the data they process.59 Any one 
of these units, called “perceptrons,” can “know” whether and how 
much to react given a particular input; taken together, the system of 
these responses governs the action of the whole machine.60 The 
difference between a neural network and an expert system is that the 
former model allows the system to “learn” through trial and error.61
Given a goal, the system can try random outputs until it successfully 
performs the desired action and then repeat that response the next 
time it gets the same or a similar input.62 Consequently, a neural 
network could, like a human, “learn” how to paint, write, or compose 
and generate a work whose creative content is not the result of any 
human intervention. At first glance, the human inventor or 
programmer of such a machine seems to have no more claim to a 
copyright in such a work than an artist’s mother has to her child’s 
work, or than a camera manufacturer has to the photos taken by 
photographers, or than a piano manufacturer has to the melody being 
created by the musicians while using the instrument. After all, 
57. Miller, supra note 54, at 980. “A congressional committee has held 
‘oversight’ hearings on the subject but has taken no action.” Id. at 980 n.7 (citing 
Computers and Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1 (1989 & 1990)).
58. Rao, supra note 53, at 509.
59. Id. (discussing how the developments of neural networks, which allows 
a system to “learn” information while training, has recently rapidly expanded).
60. Id. at 511.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 509.
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neither the inventor and programmer nor the mother nor the 
manufacturer contributed anything to the creative process except the 
artist him-, her-, or itself.
Following Scherer’s evasive definition of an intelligent 
system—“machines that are capable of performing tasks that, if 
performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence”63— one 
may still ask, what makes the system so intelligent? In other words, 
how does the system really work?
B. How Do Artificial Intelligence Systems Actually Work?
The process of recognition involves the classification or 
identification of objects, persons, events, or situations. Research 
about the human brain promoted the development of one group of 
algorithms, AI (sometimes named by its learning capability—
Machine Learning (ML)), capable of identifying objects or 
automatically classifying them in a similar way to what we believe 
and know about human perception and pattern recognition.64 One 
way the AI system functions, among many others, is by following 
the process of human perception in a few stages.65 First, the 
algorithm is presented with multiple examples and their correct 
classification (pictures of dogs, faces, signals from the body, or any 
other data that can be subject to patterns of similarities). Second, the 
algorithm breaks the data down into “tiny” electronic signals, 
undetectable by humans, and tries to identify hidden insights, 
similarities, patterns, and connections—without being explicitly 
programmed on where to look (“training”).66 Thus, the patterns and 
63. Scherer, supra note 48, at 362-64 (arguing for a reform in tort law 
regulation to cover AI systems liability). 
64. See Mauricio Orozco-Alzate & Germán Castellanos-Domínguez, 
Nearest Feature Rules and Dissimilarity Representations for Face Recognition 
Problems, in FACE RECOGNITION 337, 337-56 (Kresimir Delac & Mislav Grgic eds., 
2007); see also Mauricio Orozco-Alzate & César Germán Castellanos-Domínguez, 
Comparison of the Nearest Feature Classifiers for Face Recognition, 17 MACHINE 
VISION & APPLICATIONS 279, 279 (2006) [hereinafter Orozco-Alzate & Castellanos-
Domínguez, Comparison of the Nearest Feature Classifiers].
65. See generally Orozco-Alzate & Castellanos-Domínguez, Comparison of 
the Nearest Feature Classifiers, supra note 64.
66. Anders Krogh, What Are Artificial Neural Networks?, 26 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 195, 195-97 (2008) (describing generally how AI systems work). 
See generally James J. DiCarlo, Davide Zoccolan & Nicole C. Rust, How Does The 
Brain Solve Visual Object Recognition?, 73 NEURON 415 (2012) (explaining that 
neuroscientists are providing new clues and constraints about the algorithmic 
solution). See in practice Datasets For Machine Learning & Artificial Intelligence 
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similarities that the algorithm finds (or creates) may not be clear or 
completely understood by the programmers, trainers, or those who 
actively functionalize the system. In fact, “[m]any developers of AI 
systems now recognize that, for many applications, it can be far 
easier to train a system by showing it examples of desired input-
output behavior than to program it manually by anticipating the 
desired response for all possible inputs.”67 Astonishingly, the trainer 
can be human or another AI system.68 Third, performance improves 
with experience and evolves with new data to which the system is 
exposed.69 In other words, the system is constantly evolving as a 
result of new data it has either autonomously found or been inputted
with by data providers. For example, if we would like the AI system 
to create music, we would expose it to many songs or rhythms from 
different clusters of music, and the AI system would find 
interconnections unfamiliar even to the programmer. The AI system 
would keep evolving when exposed to new music in the future and 
would eventually be able to create new original music independently 
and without copying other works.70 A similar process would take 
place for writing new stories, painting, creating dances, programing 
design, programming software, detecting signals in roads, producing 
new drugs, and even designing AI systems.71
(AI) Training, CLICKWORKER, https://www.clickworker.com/machine-learning-ai-
artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/CAA3-YKEW] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
67. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 255 (illustrating the widespread 
nature of the adoption of data-intensive machine-learning methods).
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Larry Hardesty, Artificial-Intelligence System Surfs Web to 
Improve Its Performance, MIT NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://news.mit.edu/2016/
artificial-intelligence-system-surfs-web-improve-performance-1110/ [https://
perma.cc/2DJK-JKBT].
70. William Hochberg, When Robots Write Songs, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/08/computers-that-
compose/374916 [https://perma.cc/SMQ6-LCDY]. EMI is a software program that, 
although not intelligent, has produced aesthetically convincing new music. 
Intelligence seeks survival by the exercise of power over a surrounding 
environment. In composition, intelligence equals decision making. Every 
composition results from the selection of a finite set of constraints to operate on 
selected materials; even the most intuitive decision remains itself a decision, and 
consequently, a product of constraints. See Patrício da Silva, David Cope and 
Experiments in Musical Intelligence, SPECTRUM PRESS 1-36 (2003), 
http://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/MUSIC124/%CE%94%CE%B9%C
E%B1%CE%BB%CE%AD%CE%BE%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/da-silva-david-
cope-and-emi.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8KG-FQRB].
71. See also Rana el Kaliouby, This App Knows How You Feel – From the 
Look on Your Face, TED (2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/rana_el_kaliouby_this_
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We have already been caught unprepared by the latest 
developments. Traditional intellectual property laws have become 
irrelevant for new AI systems. Other fields, such as tort and criminal 
law, may also be unable to solve the emerging issues. Furthermore, 
the developments are proceeding rapidly. We have to cope not just 
with existing automated AI systems that create independent, creative, 
and original artworks, but we also have to be ready for the next 
generation of AI that will be capable of unsupervised learning, a 
paradigm in machine-learning research that uses random methods in 
unexpected and dangerous ways.72
C. What Makes Artificial Intelligence Systems Creative?
Over the past two decades, AI has grown from a laboratory 
curiosity to a practical technology. It has emerged as an important 
tool in developing practical software for computer vision; speech 
recognition; natural language processing; and creating artworks, 
inventions, and other applications.73 To understand the challenges 
posed by AI-created artworks, it is important to understand how 
automated AI systems produce new and creative works, which would 
have been copyrightable had humans created them.74
I identify ten features of AI systems’ algorithms that are 
important to the discussion of accountability of AI systems based on 
the copyright discourse.75 AI systems can be embedded with all or 
some of these features, all of which are interrelated and partially 
overlapping. By using these ten features, AI systems are designed to 
independently create works of useful art.76
app_knows_how_you_feel_from_the_look_on_your_face [https://perma.cc/FY39-
29AN].
72. HASTIE, TIBSHIRANI & FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 18-22 (stressing a 
principled model-based approach, often using the language of graphical models to 
specify models in a concise and intuitive way).
73. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2.
74. Id.
75. See HALLEVY, supra note 11, at 175 (discussing five different attributes 
that one would expect an intelligent entity to have—communication, internal 
knowledge, external knowledge, goal-driven behavior, creativity); see also Yanisky-
Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 2 (proposing the adoption of the 
objective approach to copyright, which enables copyrightability of works produced 
by creative robots).
76. Jason D. Lohr, Managing Patent Rights in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, LEGALTECH NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.legaltechnews.com/
id=1202765385194/Managing-Patent-Rights-in-the-?slreturn=20160819081749 
[https://perma.cc/6BTC-9DLR] (arguing that much of the AI in the use today is 
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(1) Creativity. AI systems are capable of more than just 
copying other works from accessible sources. They operate as 
creative devices capable of creating entirely new and original 
works.77 This feature is crucial in the intellectual property realm and 
in particular when discussing copyrightable artworks.
(2) Autonomous and independent.78 A device is independent or 
autonomous if it can accomplish a high-level task on its own, 
without external intervention.79 Such systems may work 
independently, with minimum human intervention.80 In this way, the 
AI systems are able to replace authors and other creators, to 
autonomously produce new artworks.81
(3) Unpredictable and new results. AI systems are based on 
algorithms capable of incorporating random input, resulting in 
unpredictable routes to the optimal solution, and hence creating 
unpredictable works (from the software programmers’ point of 
view).82 An AI system can draw a new painting, which, unlike 
copying an existing work, is new and unpredictable. After being 
exposed to colors, shapes, and techniques that are in the public 
referred to as “soft” AI systems, where the AI uses computational intelligence to 
analyze relevant data and attempt to solve a specific problem). 
77. See HUTTER, supra note 51, at 2 (mentioning creativity as one of the 
main features of AI); see also Scherer, supra note 48, at 364-65 (describing how AI 
systems detected breast cancer prognosis by checking cells of supportive tissues 
through a chess player creative move); HALLEVY, supra note 11, at 176 (arguing that 
an AI system must be creative by finding alternative ways to solve problems).
78. Crootof, supra note 19, at 1854-63 (describing the difficulty of deciding 
on a definition for autonomous weapons and suggesting a definition based on the AI 
(weapon) system being able (1) to come to conclusions (2) derived from gathered 
information and (3) is capable of independently selecting actions (selecting and 
engaging targets)).
79. Lucy Suchman & Jutta Weber, Human-Machine Autonomies, in
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY 75, 76 (Nehal Bhuta et al. 
eds., 2016).
80. See Terence Davis, The AI Revolution: Is The Future Finally Now?,
ARN (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.arnnet.com.au/article/617707/ai-revolution-
future-finally-now [https://perma.cc/UX4T-XAAB] (“What is called AI even today 
is in fact, the leveraging of machines with minimal – though not zero – human 
intelligence to solve specific, narrow problems.”). 
81. See generally Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32.
82. See Jonathon Keats, John Koza Built an Invention Machine, POPULAR 
SCI. (Apr 19, 2006), https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-
built-invention-machine [https://perma.cc/3ZB3-79LJ].
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domain, the system can “break” the data into digital components, 
recompose them, and create new and unexpected artworks.83
(4) Capable of data collection and communication with outside 
data. A significant feature of an AI system is that it can actively 
“search” for outside data. For example, e-David might autonomously
take pictures of the outside word and draw them into new, original, 
and creative works. Communication is thus a necessary feature of an 
AI system.84
(5) Learning capability. Based on the data it has gathered, an 
AI system can continue to process data by receiving feedback and 
improving the results.85
(6) Evolving. As a result of the new input and the AI system’s 
capacity for continuous processing, the system might constantly find 
new patterns and similarities and hence change the outcomes. In this 
sense, the system is constantly evolving. This feature is at the core of 
AI and data science.86
(7) Rational-intelligent system. An intelligent system is one 
with a rational mechanism capable of perceiving data and deciding 
which activities or omissions would maximize its probabilities of 
success in achieving a certain goal.87
83. See Lawrence Hunter, Molecular Biology for Computer Scientists, in
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1, 12-15 (Lawrence Hunter 
ed., 1993) (describing how similarities enable the composition of cells by its parts as 
membranes, proteins and other parts by AI systems). 
84. See generally id.; see also Deussen et al., supra note 1, at 1 
(discussing how, as part of the Rembrandt project, the robot had a camera that 
kept on photographing); Matthew Field, Facebook Shuts Down a Robots After 
They Invented Their Own Language, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:21 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/01/facebook-shuts-
robots-invent-language/ [https://perma.cc/8FRE-67VZ] (the chatbots were 
meant to learn how to negotiate by mimicking human trading and bartering; 
however, when the social network paired two of the programs, nicknamed 
Alice and Bob, to trade against each other, they started to develop their 
own bizarre form of communication that the researchers could not understand).
85. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 928-69 (explaining the process of 
perception of AI systems, in which the systems are being connected to the raw 
world, including image formation, color, edge detection, texture, segmentation of 
images, objects recognition, reconstructing the 3D world, and motions).
86. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 255, 257 (discussing recent
progress in machine learning and illustrating the wide-spread nature of the adoption 
of data-intensive machine-learning methods).
87. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 3-4, 27, 34-56, 973-85 
(describing AI systems as being capable of taking “rational” actions based on 
environmental input); see also HUTTER, supra note 51, at 2, 125-26, 231 (discussing 
how AI systems can solve problems by using features such as learning, induction, 
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(8) Efficiency. AI systems are capable of accurately, 
efficiently, and rapidly processing vast volumes of data—well 
beyond the ability of the human brain.88
(9) “Free choice.” AI systems are able to choose between 
alternatives in order to arrive at the best outcome.89 E-David, for 
example, chooses between lights, colors, and shapes while drawing.90
(10) Goal oriented. AI systems function according to goals 
such as creating, drawing, writing stories or news, or composing 
melodies or poems.91
AI systems that create artworks incorporate, to a certain level, 
all of these ten features. Once we understand these features, and that 
the AI systems create outcomes independently and autonomously, 
we realize that the rights available under copyright laws cannot be 
afforded only to human authors, and thus, the traditional copyright 
laws may be inapplicable.92 As technology advances, AI systems 
have become increasingly capable of mimicking part of the functions 
that we once considered intrinsic to the human mind’s creativity. AI 
deduction, building analogies and optimization, as well as using knowledge); DAVID 
L. POOLE & ALAN K. MACKWORTH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FOUNDATION OF 
COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS 71, 283-334, 597-611 (2010) (describing AI systems as 
agents of cognitive skills such as: problem solving, searching for data, learning and 
evolving, rational planning, and more).
88. GEORGE F. LUGER, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: STRUCTURES AND 
STRATEGIES FOR COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING 26 (6th ed. 2016) (arguing that AI can 
refer to all programming techniques trying to solve problems more efficiently than 
algorithmic solutions and can operate close to the intelligence of human behavior); 
Woodrow Hartzog et al., Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1763, 1765-67, 1793-95 (arguing that automated machines are more 
efficient than human but this is a risky factor and that law enforcement of automated 
machine should preserve inefficiency for ethical reasons).
89. Scherer, supra note 48, at 361-62 (arguing that even when AI systems 
act rationally, they can still pose public risk—killing efficiently, for example).
90. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 66.
92. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 4-7. The discourse about AI 
systems includes controversial arguments about the philosophy regarding AI 
systems. For example, can machines perceive and understand (i.e., can they pass the 
Chinese test)? Are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same (i.e., can 
they pass the Turing test)? What is intelligence? What does it mean that a machine 
think or act rationally; can a machine be self-aware? Can a machine be original or 
creative? Id. However, one must also be aware of the “Eliza Effect.” See ROBERT 
TRAPPL, PAOLO PETTA & SABINE PAYR, EMOTIONS IN HUMAN ARTIFACTS 353 (Robert 
Trappl, Paolo Petta & Sabine Payr eds., 2002) (describing the “Eliza Effect” as the 
tendency for people to treat machines or programs that are responsive as having 
more intelligence than they really do, as having human traits, and finding analogies 
between human behaviors and computer behaviors).
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systems will be able to improve specific human skills, not only in 
terms of accuracy or capacity to process vast amounts of data, but 
also in terms of creativity, autonomy, novelty, and other features 
necessary for establishing copyrightable works. Moreover, 
autonomous AI systems will be able to develop new artworks 
without significant guidance or instructions from humans.93
Generally, the human or entity behind the process is at the 
forefront of legal discussions. This Article calls for a different 
solution, one from an alternate point of view—the intellectual 
property and copyright laws at stake in this area. The inquiry begins 
with considering whether AI systems may own the products they 
produce. While this Article agrees that understanding the human-like 
features of AI may lead to the conclusion that an artwork being 
generated by an AI system might belong to the AI system, unlike 
other scholars, this Article argues that the traditional copyright laws 
may be irrelevant and inapplicable to these situations and that either 
modifications or other legal tools should replace them.94 The next 
Part will begin by addressing the discourse of ownership and 
accountability for AI systems producing original works.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTONOMOUS AI SYSTEMS—THE 
COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE 
AI systems are commonly used to generate works for personal 
or industrial goals. Who should benefit from the works being 
produced by the AI systems? Who should bear responsibility when 
something goes wrong? In other words, who is entitled to the rights? 
Who should be accountable when AI systems infringe on third 
parties’ rights or counterfeit existing works? Should it be the 
programmers, the trainers, the users, or, perhaps, the AI systems 
themselves?
93. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and 
the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2016) (stating that AI 
systems and computers are already generating patentable inventions and arguing that 
AI should receive patent rights in its inventions); see also Lohr, supra note 76
(discussing how AI systems will be able to able to operate without significant 
guidance or instruction and to develop new products and processes).
94. See Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080-81 (stating that AI systems own the 
IP rights).
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A. Accountability Matters
Advanced technologies, such as AI systems, are forcing us as a 
society to face new ethical and legal challenges and to rethink basic 
concepts such as ownership and accountability. Scholars have not yet 
deeply discussed the notion of copyright accountability for 
infringements involving AI systems, even though AI systems are 
themselves copyrightable.
According to scholars such as Hanoch Dagan, Michael Heller, 
and others, ownership of property rights (applicable also to 
intellectual property rights) is not merely a question of benefits 
arising from the right to exclude others from enjoying, using, or 
licensing the objects.95 It is also a question of accountability for using 
it with consideration for other humans’ and entities’ rights. 
Moreover, ownership may also entail rights of others to enjoy the 
property.96 This is also true when discussing AI systems. Adopting 
this accountability for property rights approach of Dagan and Heller 
into the discussion on intellectual property rights, in regard to works 
generated by AI systems, allows us to bind together the benefits and 
accountabilities of ownership.
The main risk we face today and in the near future is that of 
losing control over the operation of AI systems.97 Moreover, we risk 
losing control not only of one AI system, but also two or more AI 
systems acting in concert “behind our backs.” Therefore, I have 
decided to focus on accountability for works generated by AI 
systems98 as AI systems threaten all social and legal regimes.99
95. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE 
L.J. 549, 559-60 (2001) (seeing ownership of property as accountability for others); 
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1409, 1421-22, 1438-39 (2012) (property law regimes cannot be based on the right 
of exclusion alone; rather, they must be based on human relationships).
96. See Schlackman, supra note 5.
97. See Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial 
Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter 
[https://perma.cc/8FL8-UP6Q] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
98. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: 
When Computers Inhibit Competition 37-38 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 18; Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 267, 2015). See also Field,
supra note 84.
99. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE 
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 56-82, 85-144, 147-202 
(2016) (describing how consumers reap many benefits from online shopping and 
how the sophisticated algorithms behind online retail are changing the nature of 
market competition, including in negative ways. The authors describe one danger as 
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Professor Jack Balkin describes several problems of AI 
systems.100 The first problem entails the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among human beings when non-human agents create 
benefits, like artistic works, or cause harms, like physical injuries.101
The difficulty arises from the fact that the behavior of robotic and AI 
systems is “emergent,” meaning their actions may be unpredictable 
or unconstrained by human expectations.102 Robotics and AI thus 
feature emergent behaviors that escape human planning and 
expectations.103 Balkin further cautions that we should not consider 
all features of a technology to be essential without first considering 
how the technology is used in society.104 It would thus be unhelpful 
to codify certain features as “essential” because they may in reality 
be transient features arising from current uses and social trends.105
B. AI Systems as Independent Legal Entities: The Personhood and 
Consciousness Approach vs. The Firm Approach
Many scholars have recently adopted the idea that autonomy, 
creativity, and spontaneous evolution of AI systems leads to the 
recognition of AI systems (and robot embedded systems) as 
independent legal entities entitled to legal and commercial rights and 
duties.106 In other words, scholars argue that the AI system is an 
being computers colluding with one another. They describe a second danger as 
behavioral discrimination based on companies tracking and profiling consumers to 
get them to buy goods at the highest price they are willing to pay. The authors posit 
a third danger as the “frenemy” relationship between super-platforms and 
independent app developers. They caution that data-driven monopolies dictate the 
flow of personal data and determine who gets to exploit potential buyers); Crootof, 
supra note 19, at 1842-43 (describing the threat of tort war over autonomous 
weapons).
100. See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR.
45, 45 (2015).
101. See id. at 46, 48-49. 
102. See id. at 45-46.
103. Id. at 46 (arguing that robotics and AI raise the “substitution effect,” 
meaning people will substitute robots and AI agents for living things but only in 
certain ways and only for certain purposes. Balkin argues this substitution is likely 
to be incomplete, contextual, unstable, and often opportunistic).
104. See id. at 45. 
105. Id. (contending that innovation in technology is not just about tools and 
techniques, but also economic, social and legal relations, which in turn affects how 
technologies may change).
106. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 1-3 (2011) (arguing for the legal personhood of 
an artificial agent that will soon be independent, and discussing the artificial agent as 
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autonomous legal entity that may, and should, be responsible for the 
outcome of its own actions or omissions.107 This conclusion may be 
based on two alternative premises. First, the defining features of AI 
systems—intelligence, rationality, independence, and the like—are 
similar to those of humans; therefore, they should be treated as 
independent entities with legal rights and duties. Alternatively, AI 
systems are analogous to firms, which are separate, non-human legal 
entities capable of possessing legal rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities.
1. The Personhood and Consciousness Approach to AI Systems
Can robots be human persons and hence entitled to legal rights 
(and duties)? Can Ava, one of the robots in the movie Ex Machina, 
be considered the owner of the copyright in her painting and have the 
duty to avoid infringing other humans’ or robots’ rights?108 Or can 
only humans be persons?
“Artificial intelligence already exhibits many human 
characteristics. Given our history of denying rights to certain 
humans, we should recognize that robots are [like] people and have 
human rights.”109 This statement by Harvard Law Professor Glenn 
capable of having “knowledge” and decision-making ability); Abbott, supra note 93,
at 1080 (arguing that artificial intelligence systems should be considered inventors 
for the purposes of patent law). See also JOHN FRANK WEAVER, ROBOTS ARE PEOPLE 
TOO: HOW SIRI, GOOGLE CAR, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL FORCE US TO 
CHANGE OUR LAWS 1, 3-4 (2014) (arguing that robots are independent entities).
107. Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080 (arguing that computers are already 
generating patentable subject matters qualifying as inventors and overtaking human 
inventors as primary source of new discoveries and inventions, and therefore, AI 
should receive patent rights in their inventions). See also Colin R. Davies, An 
Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property Rights – Artificial Intelligence and 
Intellectual Property, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 601, 617-19 (2011),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364911001518 [https://
perma.cc/RR6K-W56M] (claiming that the systems can be the authors and the 
inventors). 
108. EX MACHINA, supra note 24.
109. Glenn Cohen, Should We Grant AI Moral and Legal Personhood?,
ARTIFICIAL BRAIN (Sept. 24, 2016), http://artificialbrain.xyz/should-we-grant-ai-
moral-and-legal-personhood [https://perma.cc/ELL3-CQRK]; see also Big Think, 
A.I. Ethics: Should We Grant Them Moral and Legal Personhood?, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvcbOSAkF2M [https://perma.cc/
6QAR-2W4N] (discussing the distinction between people and human beings, and 
suggesting granting more rights to AI systems so that we do not err and find 
ourselves on the wrong side of history even though, at the heart of the matter, the 
idea scares a lot of people). 
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Cohen reflects not only his claim that AI already does much of what 
human beings can do, but also the reality that the digital software of 
AI systems, which mimics human intelligence, is already far superior 
to our own.110 Ongoing developments in natural language and 
emotion detection suggest that AI will continue its encroachment on 
the domain of human abilities.
The personhood approach to AI systems sees the systems as 
capable of experiencing consciousness. The goal of the artificial 
consciousness approach is to explore the cognitive abilities in 
robots.111 Igor Aleksander suggested more than a dozen principles for 
artificial consciousness, including conscious and unconscious states, 
learning, memorizing, prediction, self-awareness, representation of 
meaning, language, will, instinct, and emotion.112 The aim of 
artificial consciousness is to define whether and how these and other 
aspects of consciousness can be synthesized in an engineered artifact 
such as a digital computer.
By virtue of modeling itself, AI systems have sensations and 
are able to make decisions freely. This can be regarded as having
consciousness.113 The ability to produce consciousness—the ability 
to experience things, which is found in humans as well as in AI 
systems—means the ability to recognize, allocate, organize, and 
recall cognitive sources. Consciousness occurs when we have a
symbol for things. We do not know what taste or smell means for 
any individual human, but we can recognize it by connecting it to an 
existing symbol.114 This may also be true for AI systems. This 
approach of computationalism sees the human brain, essentially, as a 
110. See Cohen, supra note 109.
111. James A. Reggia, The Rise of Machine Consciousness: Studying 
Consciousness with Computational Models, 44 NEURAL NETWORKS 112, 112-31
(2013) (describing the artificial consciousness approach also known as AC).
112. See generally Igor Aleksander, Machine Consciousness, in BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS (Max Velmans & Susan Schneider eds., 2007). 
113. Drew McDermott, Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS 117, 140-150 (Philip David Zelazo, 
Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson eds., 2007) (claiming that tests such as the 
Turing test and the Chinese box test are not necessarily relevant to the 
computational theory of consciousness. In Turing’s test a person tries to distinguish 
a computer from a person by carrying on typed conversations with the computer. If 
the person who judges the system thinks the computer is human about 50% of the 
time, then the computer passes the test and is considered less distinguishable from a 
human. The Chinese Box test concerns situations where a machine uses inputs to 
create reasonable and logical outcomes, but does not “understand” how or why those 
outcomes are the correct responses).
114. Id. at 118. 
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computer.115 Once we establish the concept of an impersonal level of 
meaning in brains and computers, we can introduce the idea of a self-
model, a device that a robot or a person could use to answer 
questions about how it interacts with the world.116 This idea was 
introduced by Minsky almost forty years ago, and has since been 
explored by others.117 Other scholars claim that “consciousness is a 
property of complex systems that have a particular ‘cause-effect’ 
repertoire.”118 They interact with the world in ways similar to the 
way the brain does. “If you were to build a computer that has the 
same circuitry as the brain, this computer would also have 
consciousness associated with it. . . . However, the same is not true 
for digital simulations.”119
This approach sees the AI system as a person and thus as 
capable of bearing rights and duties. An alternative approach 
imposes rights and duties on AI systems from a different angle—that 
of the firm approach.
2. The Corporate Approach
The corporation as a legal entity can serve as a legal basis for 
imposing rights and duties on AI systems. Corporations are legal 
entities subject to a legal regime, including corporate, labor, and 
even criminal law.120 Therefore, the question relating to AI entities 
has become: Does the growing intelligence of AI entities subject 
them, as any other legal entity, to legal social control?121
115. Id.
116. See generally id. at 117-150.
117. See MARVIN L. MINSKY, SEMANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 1
(Marvin Minksy ed., 1968) (discussing multiple experiments that explored 
intelligent machines nearly four decades ago); Aaron Sloman & Ron Chrisley, 
Virtual Machines and Consciousness, 10 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 1, 18 (2003).
118. Antonio Regalado, What it Will Take for Computers to Be Conscious,
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/531146/what-
it-will-take-for-computers-to-be-conscious [https://perma.cc/JPP5-LBSD].
119. Id.
120. See STEVEN BOX, POWER, CRIME AND MYSTIFICATION 16-79 (1983); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386-87
(1981); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for 
Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L.
REV. 468, 469 (1988).
121. See generally Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some 
Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 
(1970); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial 
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There are several consequences to this approach. In Europe, for 
example, there is a strong movement arguing that robots should pay 
taxes.122 Scholars have also proposed that AI systems should be held 
liable for any criminal offenses committed by the systems.123
If assessed through the lens of copyright laws, this approach 
would result in AI systems’ ownership of the intellectual property 
products and processes they generate.124 Under this view, the AI 
system is the protagonist: when it acts autonomously, it is the true 
creator or producer of the products. In this case, the owner might be 
the AI system itself. Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act states that 
“[c]opyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the 
author[.]”125 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that, as a general 
rule, “the author is the party who actually creates the work.”126
Scholars have also endorsed this position, arguing that the AI system 
Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984); Antonio A. Martino, Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, 2 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 154 (1994); L. Thorne McCarty, 
Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977); Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957 
(1990).
122. Michaela Georgina Lexer & Luisa Scarcella, The Effects of Artificial 
Intelligence on Labor Markets – A Critical Analysis of Solution Models from a Tax 
Law and Social Security Law Perspective (working manuscript) (on file with the 
authors) (arguing that robots should pay taxes and describing the European practical 
approach supporting this idea); see also Chris Weller, Bill Gates Says Robots That 
Take Your Job Should Pay Taxes, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2017, 9:57 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-robots-pay-taxes-2017-2 [https://
perma.cc/J3DJ-PKKN] (describing an interview with Bill Gates where he argued 
that robot tax could finance jobs taking care of elderly people or working with kids 
in schools, for which needs are unmet and to which humans are particularly well 
suited). 
123. See generally HALLEVY, supra note 11 (developing a general and 
legally sophisticated theory of the criminal liability for AI and robotics).
124. See, e.g., Mark Fischer, Are Copyrighted Works Only by and for 
Humans? The Copyright Planet of the Apes and Robots, DUANE MORRIS BLOG (Aug. 
18, 2014), https://blogs.duanemorris.com/newmedialaw/2014/08/18/are-
copyrighted-works-only-by-and-for-humans-the-copyright-planet-of-the-apes-and-
robots [https://perma.cc/C9Z5-X5AY] (arguing that the future of copyright may 
someday be in the hands of non-humans).
125. See 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (2012) (ownership of copyright).
126. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989); see also Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 
AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1996).
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should be accountable for the outcome of its own actions or 
omissions.127
Ownership, however, might be a result of a commercial 
contract and not of copyright laws.128 This view of AI systems
ultimately considers the AI system to be the owner of its works. 
Scholars, however, have criticized this view on the grounds that it is 
an untenable proposition.129 Moreover, the length of protection is 
designed after the life of the creator.130 Moral rights, including the 
entitlement of the author to credit as well as the author’s control over 
changes and modifications to the work, remain unresolved when AI 
systems generate works. 
C. Behind Every Robot There Is a Person: Looking for the Human(s) 
Behind the Machine
Arthur R. Miller said, “[B]ehind every robot there is a good 
person.”131 This phrase, which represents the traditional approach to 
AI in the U.S. and Europe, supports the default view of programmers 
as the creators entitled to ownership of the works created by the AI 
systems they have programmed.132 Under this view, ownership and 
127. Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080 (arguing that computers are already 
generating patentable subject matters qualifying as inventors and overtaking human 
inventors as primary source of new discoveries and inventions and therefore, AI 
should receive patent rights in their inventions).
128. Id. at 1115-17.
129. See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially 
Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, 
Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1185, 1226-28 (1985) (arguing that rights should accrue to the user of the 
program as the best practical solution); Robert Yu, The Machine Author: What Level 
of Copyright Is Appropriate for Fully Independent Computer-Generated Works?,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1263-65 (the author suggests the contribution–rights 
paradox: from a social policy standpoint, entitling the rights to independent 
computer-generated works is wrong). But see Fischer, supra note 124 (arguing that 
the future of copyright may someday be in the hands of non-humans).
130. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is 
an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 87-88 (1985).
131. Miller, supra note 54, at 1045.
132. See Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for 
Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 265, 271, 275 (2016) 
(stating that a computer user who initiates the creation of computer-generated 
expression should be recognized as the author and copyright owner of the resulting 
work); John Frank Weaver, How Artificial Intelligence Might Monetize Fan Fiction,
SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/
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accountability for works generated by AI systems are given to the 
creators of the AI systems.133 According to this view, the ownership 
of works generated by AI systems and, hence, the accountability for 
these works “belong” to the humans (and the entities working on 
their behalf) involved in the process of developing the AI systems. 
The human behind the program—usually the programmer—has 
become an important figure in other fields of law that involve harm 
and damages resulting from AI systems, such as criminal law or tort 
law.134
This traditional approach is reflected in various European 
Union laws. For example, the British Copyright, Designs, and 
Patents Act of 1988 takes the approach that copyright protection is 
proper for persons responsible for a computer’s creation.135 The Act 
states: “In this Part ‘author’, in relation to a work, means the person 
who creates it.”136 Even the broader approach regarding computers 
generating artworks is looking for the person behind the creation 
process. Article 9(3) of the Act says: “(3) In the case of a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the 
author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”137
The U.S. also holds this attitude, as reflected by the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU), which was created to advise Congress on whether then-
emerging technologies necessitated a change in copyright laws.138
CONTU concluded that computers were, at least at that time, merely 
tools for facilitating human creativity.139 According to this approach,
12/10/ai_intellectual_property_rights_how_artificial_intelligence_might_monetize.h
tml [https://perma.cc/Z2D4-YN7K].
133. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 6, 18 (discussing inventions 
being produced by AI systems).
134. See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules 
and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 120-29 (2014); see also O’Brien 
v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 10 C 3005, 2011 WL 3040479, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. 
July 25, 2011) (granting summary judgment to surgical robot’s manufacturer).
135. See Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 3, 9 (Eng.).
136. Id. § 9(1).
137. Id. § 9(3).
138. U.S., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 3, 4 (1978), http://www.digital-law-
online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html [https://perma.cc/A5GC-446C] [hereinafter 
CONTU FINAL REPORT].
139. See id. at 45. 
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The computer, like [the] camera or [] typewriter, is an inert instrument, 
capable of functioning only when activated either directly or indirectly by 
a human . . . [and] affects the copyright status of a resultant work no more 
than the employment of a still or motion-picture camera, a tape recorder, 
or typewriter.140
Entities, such as employers and firms, are thus entitled to copyright 
ownership as the transferees of those programmers.141
This Article criticizes this traditional approach and calls on 
policymakers to revisit copyright laws in light of already-existing 
advanced technology and the latest developments in AI systems.142 I
argue that, inevitably, current copyright law will not be able to cope 
with AI systems’ productivity and creativity.143 One reason is that too 
many stakeholders are involved in the process of creating the AI 
system itself, with no one acting as the main contributor.144 This 
point of view holds the contributors involved in the process as 
owners of the AI system, and thus the ones responsible for works 
generated by the AI system.145
1. Who Could the Owner Be?
The candidates for ownership of, and subsequent accountability 
for, AI works vary from one case to another.146 However, entitlement 
to these rights depends on each candidate’s direct or indirect 
contributions to the AI system.147 I claim that due to the multi-player 
model, most of the time, the candidates who are involved in the 
development and manufacture of the AI system do not meet the 
threshold of authorship.148 The programming and algorithms used by 
robots and AI systems may be the work of many hands and may
employ generative technologies that allow innovation at multiple 
140. Id. at 44-45.
141. Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
142. See Fischer, supra note 124 (noting that non-human systems will 
created copyrightable works).
143. See id.
144. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 20 (suggesting that 
multiple stakeholders in inventions created by AI systems disrupts the traditional 
patent process because there is no single inventor).
145. See id. (discussing inventions being produced by AI systems).
146. See id. (discussing ownership in the context of responsibility for 
infringement).
147. See id. In the case of The Next Rembrandt, one entity included all the 
players.
148. See id. (describing the multi-player model in regard to AI systems 
generating inventions).
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layers.149 These features of robotics and AI enhance unpredictability 
and complicate causal responsibility for what robots and AI systems 
do.150 In addition to the AI system software programmers, there are 
(too) many players and stakeholders that contribute to the process of 
creating, designing, developing and producing the AI systems 
themselves, but not the product autonomously produced by the AI 
systems. Among others are the data suppliers, trainers, feedback 
suppliers, holders of the AI system, system operators, employers or 
investors, the public, and the government. The large number of 
players significantly weakens each player’s individual contribution 
and thus the bond between the software programmers and the 
products produced by the AI systems. There are many options for 
who should own the works created by AI systems and, indeed, one 
role may overlap with another. The following discussion will focus 
on some of these players.
First, there are the programmers of the AI system. Second, 
there are the trainers or the data providers, who may be among the 
most important figures shaping the final functions of the AI systems. 
Third, there are the feedback providers, or individuals whose task is 
to provide the AI system with a signal that allows it to distinguish 
right from wrong and sometimes to select the best result from many 
random, meaningless results.151 Fourth, there is the AI system’s 
owner, whether that system is hardware or software. The owner 
might be the corporation, as the owner of the hardware (robot) or the 
software, or it might be the buyer of the AI systems (or robots). 
Fifth, there is the operator of the AI system, or the person who 
activates the system and enables its creation (although, it should be 
noted, some advanced AI systems can operate by themselves without 
a human operator).152 If one applies a practical approach, the operator 
could also be the manufacturer.153 Sixth, there is the buyer of the 
149. See Balkin, supra note 100, at 53 (noting that AI has innovation at 
multiple layers).
150. See id. (discussing causal responsibility of AI based on multiple hands 
working on programming and algorithms).
151. See Abbott, supra note 93, at 1082 (arguing “a computer’s owner 
should be the default assignee of any invention, both because this is most consistent 
with the rules governing ownership of property, and because it would most 
incentivize innovation”); Weeks, supra note 30, at 93.
152. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1205 (discussing the role of the 
programmer and the programmer’s claims to ownership).
153. See generally RICHARD T. WATSON, INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2012) 
(explaining the roles of manufacturers in AI systems).
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product.154 Seventh, the government or governmental entities could 
be entitled to ownership of products as a default or as a 
representative of the public. Eighth, the public could also be one of 
the candidates for ownership in cases of public domain policy.155
Furthermore, different paradigms of ownership can exist regarding 
the suggested owners of works created by AI systems. In regard to 
these options, ownership could be sole ownership by one player or 
co-ownership by multiple stakeholders.
I argue that none of the players are entitled to ownership of the 
works generated by AI systems nor are they accountable for these 
works. Because of the features of AI systems—creative, 
autonomous, unpredictable, and evolving—none of the players can 
directly claim ownership and accountability of the works generated 
by AI systems. Furthermore, there are too many players involved in 
the process, and none of the players are the main contributor to the 
creation of the work. For example, although data and feedback 
providers are crucial to the process, they cannot be considered as 
owners because they are not authors. Thus, only one figure—the 
programmer—remains as a candidate for ownership and 
accountability.156
2. Distinguishing Between the Rights over Artificial 
Intelligence Software; the Rights of Works Produced by 
Automated AI Systems; and the Rights of Programmers
For traditional artworks, the creators (or, in some cases, their 
employers or main contractors) are entitled to copyright over the 
artworks they produce, subject to several conditions.157 As discussed 
above, developing the next generation of creative AI systems 
involves many participants, including software programmers and the 
154. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1207-08.
155. See Muzdalifah Faried Bakry & Zhilang He, Autonomous Creation –
Creation by Robots: Who Owns the IP Rights?, MAASTRICHT U. (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://law.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ipkm/autonomous-creation-creation-by-robots-
who-owns-the-ip-rights [https://perma.cc/2YCC-RPER] (arguing that artificial 
intelligence belongs in the public domain); Natasha Lomas, We Need To Talk About 
AI and Access to Publicly Funded Data-Sets, TECHCRUNCH (July 9, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/09/we-need-to-talk-about-ai-and-access-to-publicly-
funded-data-sets/ [https://perma.cc/G7KZ-97CN] (explaining public domain data on 
Google).
156. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1205 (discussing the role of the 
programmer and the programmer’s claims to ownership).
157. See Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
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companies for which they are working or those who commissioned 
the algorithm that generated the work, trainers that provide the data, 
and many other contributors.158 The work itself, however, might be 
created digitally by an AI system embedded in a computer. I argue 
that the programmers of the software may be entitled to the copyright 
of the program, but may not necessarily have the rights for future 
products created by the AI system. I support this claim both 
conceptually and legally.
Conceptually, I argue that AI systems reflect a discipline 
focused on three inter-related components that are similar to the 
“human” traits of intelligence. First, unlike traditional software, the 
similarities and interconnections that the AI systems identify or find, 
process, remember, use, and implement may, in many cases, be 
unknown to the programmer. Second, in contrast to fixed and framed 
software, the AI system evolves and develops as a result of new 
input and new results. Third, the AI system’s works are significantly 
unpredictable because the system constantly and automatically 
evolves through its experiences.159 In short, because of their
intelligence components, AI systems are not only more accurate, of 
higher quality, and faster at processing details, but are also capable 
of creating unpredictable, original, and creative artworks and other 
products—all of which are unknown to their programmers. 
Therefore, these works created by AI systems could have been 
copyrightable under U.S. copyright laws.160
Legally, the rights of an AI software program and the rights of 
artworks can be distinguished from one another. Software is usually 
protected not only by copyright laws, but also by the Constitution of 
the United States,161 which grants exclusive rights to “Authors and 
Inventors” in their respective “Writings and Discoveries.”162
However, the discourse about software ownership is distinct from the 
question of ownership of products (and services) produced by AI 
systems. One question that remains is whether the works produced 
by AI systems should or could be entitled to copyright protection. 
Can AI-generated works be regarded as proper “works of 
authorship” pursuant to § 102 of the Copyright Act by virtue of AI’s 
158. See supra Part I (listing the AI participants).
159. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 129, at 20 (explaining requirements for 
copyrighting); see also supra note 66.
160. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 129, at 20 (explaining requirements for 
copyrighting). 
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162. See id.
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sufficient nexus to human creativity?163 Should this protection (if it 
does exist) also be applied to inventions produced by AI systems?164
On the one hand, I do not challenge the programmers’ entitlement to 
copyright ownership in the software they develop, but on the other 
hand, I argue that the entitlement to the software does not 
automatically result in ownership over the products created by AI 
systems.165 I further conclude that the software programmers are not 
the owners of the works produced by AI systems, just as the owner 
of a brush or a camera does not hold the rights over the painting or 
the photo produced by those objects.
The distinction between programming the AI software itself 
and authoring the works the automated AI machine creates can be 
better understood by thinking about a piano and the author of the 
melodies created by using the piano. Imagine a melody that is 
created by Z playing a piano that was programed and designed by A, 
manufactured by B, and owned by C. Is the piano (or the ownership 
of the piano) as the musical instrument, serving as the platform for 
the creation, relevant to the question of ownership of the melody?166 I
argue that neither the person who produced (or invented) the piano 
nor the factory that produced it are the owners of the melody created 
by a third entity (whether a human or an AI system).
Another relevant example would be the well-known selfie 
taken by a monkey with someone else’s camera.167 In this example, a 
monkey on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi took a photograph 
using a camera owned by David Slater, a nature photographer.168 But 
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
164. See § 107 (under Copyright’s “fair use” doctrine, others can reproduce 
the copyrighted inventions for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
scholarship, or research”); Thomas Caswell & Kimberly Van Amburg, Copyright 
Protection on the Internet, in E-COPYRIGHT LAW HANDBOOK 7-1, 7-8 (Laura Lee 
Stapleton ed., 2003) (arguing that all who independently create inventions might be 
entitled to patent rights in order to protect it); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability 
of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 1015-16 (1986). 
165. See RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION 194 (6th ed. 2016); see also
Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
166. But see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related 
Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1148 (1990) (arguing that the role of the 
software programmer is crucial).
167. Camila Domonoske, Monkey Can’t Own Copyright to His Selfie, 
Federal Judge Says, NPR (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/01/07/462245189/federal-judge-says-monkey-cant-own-copyright-to-his-
selfie [https://perma.cc/5N7J-YKZ5].
168. See id.
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Slater didn’t trip the shutter—the monkey did.169 The People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the 
monkey, arguing that Naruto, the monkey, owns the copyright, 
which PETA offered to administer on the monkey’s behalf.170 Since 
the dispute began, “[t]he U.S. Copyright Office . . . has specifically 
listed a photograph taken by a monkey as an example of an item 
that cannot be copyrighted. Slater, meanwhile, has a British 
copyright for the photo, which he argues should be honored 
worldwide.”171 He has asked the U.S. court to dismiss PETA’s 
claim.172 “Imagining a monkey as the copyright ‘author’ in Title 17 
of the United States Code is a farcical journey Dr. Seuss might have 
written,” according to Slater’s lawyer.173
I argue that the producer or the seller of the instrument that 
served as the platform for producing new works (i.e., the camera, 
piano, or paintbrush)—like the software programmers or the 
companies in charge of producing the platform—are unsuitable
candidates for being the creators or stakeholders of the works 
generated by the platform.174 The owner of the work is the entity that 
generated the work. I argue that the rights to the AI systems’ 
algorithms, which can be owned by the human creator, are distinct 
from the rights to the artworks the systems produce.
The code itself will have copyright protection. One could make 
the claim that the output generated from the computer program is a 
derivative work product of the underlying copyrighted program, 
which may also provide copyright protection to whomever holds a 
copyright in the algorithm. Thus, the holder of the copyright for the 
algorithm would hold the copyright for the output too.175 However, in 
1973, the Supreme Court interpreted the authorship requirement of 
the Copyright Act to include “any physical rendering of the fruits of 
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (describing how, according to Slater’s lawyer, “[t]he only pertinent 
fact in this case is that Plaintiff is a monkey suing for copyright infringement”).
173. Id.
174. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016); Sarah Jeong, Judge Gives Monkey Second Chance to Sue 
for Copyright Infringement, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 1, 2016, 3:40 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/judge-gives-monkey-second-chance-to-sue-for-
copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/AG8N-DPMY] (discussing the judge’s 
decision to give PETA leave to amend the complaint and try again to get damages 
from Slater).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”176 The Court concluded that, 
in most cases, a computer requires a significant amount of input from 
a human user in order to generate artistic output.177
I argue that when the computer produces most of the output 
independently and creatively, it is less likely that the output might be 
considered to be the original source of the work and not as derivative 
work. I do not oppose the programmer’s entitlement to ownership of 
the AI system itself. However, I do contest the human behind the 
machine’s point of view and the idea that this entitlement 
automatically results in the programmer owning the products and 
processes created by the AI system.178 I claim that my conclusion 
influences other cases beyond the intellectual property arena.179 This 
brings me to another scenario targeting the AI system itself as being 
responsible for its own works.
3. Other Possible Accountable Entities
In other legal regimes, scholars have suggested strict liability as 
a solution for addressing the damages caused by AI systems, without 
blaming either the AI system or its programmers.180 Strict liability is 
often employed when it would be too complicated to prove guilt, 
negligence, or a causal link between the defendant’s failure to 
exercise due care and the damages that occurred.181 I argue that, due
to the autonomous, creative, and unpredictable nature of AI systems, 
using the traditional strict liability rule on individuals would be 
unjust and inefficient. 
Another option is to target the government or governmental 
body as being accountable.182 In some fields, such as international 
176. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. See infra Section II.C (discussing the human behind the machine point 
of view and why this Article is critical of it).
179. See infra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing accountability implications of 
the idea that an AI creator does not necessarily own the AI’s output).
180. See Vladeck, supra note 134, at 146.
181. See, e.g., id. (“My proposal is to construct a system of strict liability, 
completely uncoupled from notions of fault for this select group of cases. A strict 
liability regime cannot be based here on the argument that the vehicles are ‘ultra-
hazardous’ or ‘unreasonably risky’ for the simple reason that diver-less vehicles are 
likely to be far less hazardous or risky than the products they replace.”). See also 
Crootof, supra note 11, at 1394-95 (arguing that autonomous weapons are designed 
to kill and their independent actions break the chain of causality, thereby making the 
strict liability rule applicable).
182. See Scherer, supra note 48, at 394.
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law and autonomous weapons, the state is in the best position, at a 
practical level, to ensure compliance with the law (e.g., that 
autonomous weapons systems are designed and employed in 
compliance with international law).183 States also have deep enough 
pockets to pay damages to the victims, in addition to being involved 
in developing, purchasing and using AI systems.184 According to the 
proposed model, states as employers or users would bear 
responsibility for AI systems not because they are states per se, but 
rather for the reasons mentioned above, due to their status as users.185
I argue that, at the national level, unlike the international level, 
responsibility could be forced. There may also be third party 
accountability.186 In these solutions, accountability is not necessarily 
connected to ownership because the works generated by AI systems 
can be public domain, and copyrights laws may thus not be 
applicable at all.187
I think that, under the copyright regime, these solutions do not 
efficiently serve the goal of imposing accountability on the player 
who should—along with enjoying the benefits of using AI systems—
also take responsibility for such systems. I have discussed two 
alternative points of view.188 First, the AI systems themselves could 
be the owners and the ones responsible for their works.189 Second,
the humans behind the machine (i.e., those involved in the process of 
developing the AI systems) could be the owners and the ones 
responsible for works generated by AI systems.190 Since neither of 
these perspectives seems applicable and justified to the questions of 
ownership and accountability, I now turn to addressing these issues 
under a theoretical justification framework.
183. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1390.
184. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 48, at 357, 394 (“This article will advance 
the discussion regarding the feasibility and pitfalls of government regulation of AI 
by examining these issues and explaining why there are, nevertheless, some 
potential paths to effective AI regulation.”). See also Crootof, supra note 11, at 
1389-93 (arguing that states are reluctant to take responsibility regarding 
autonomous weapons).
185. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1390.
186. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 134, at 148.
187. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 18-21 (suggesting that 
inventions produced by AI systems will not be protected by the patent law).
188. See supra Part II.
189. See supra Section II.B.
190. See supra Section II.C.
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III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
Many intuitively feel that AI systems, sophisticated robots, and 
machines should not be able to have rights and duties; nor should 
they hold copyrights. This intuition has its roots in strong theoretical 
and legal arguments.191 The following discussion will explain the 
difficulties of seeing AI systems as totally independent from human 
control. The discourse concerning the justifications for intellectual 
property focuses on three main substantive theories: law and 
economics, which examines intellectual property rules according to 
their cumulative efficiency and ability to promote total welfare; 
personality theory, which focuses on the personality of the creators; 
and Lockean labor theory, which justifies the property interest as the 
fruits of the creator’s labor.192 Today, U.S. intellectual property law 
is based primarily on the law and economics utilitarianism 
approach193 and, in part, John Locke’s theory of labor.194 By contrast, 
the civil law approach to copyright protection justifies property 
rights by the importance of the creators’ personality in the works 
(personality approach), as well as by the ownership of the fruits 
stemming from the person’s body and soul (Locke’s approach or 
labor approach).195
191. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing 
Justification of Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus 
International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 1, 8-9 (2017).
192. See id. at 4-9 (describing the three major approaches to theoretical 
justifications to intellectual property laws and arguing that distributive justice 
theory, although discussed by some scholars, is wrongfully considered to be neither 
a substantial nor a major justification of intellectual property; it is rather seen as an 
exception or postscript to the mainstream theoretical justifications). See also 
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169-75 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) 
(describing various theories underlying intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1988) (discussing the 
different justifications to intellectual property laws).
193. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 50 (3d ed. 2004) 
(“[T]he predominant justification for American intellectual property law has been 
. . . utilitarianism.”).
194. Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the Invention Is an Inventor: Revitalizing 
Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV.
779, 781-82 (2008).
195. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (discussing the personality and labor approach to 
intellectual property); Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 34, at 118.
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A. Law & Economics
The U.S. system of copyright laws was established to protect 
original authors and creators by giving them exclusive rights and 
control over the works they generate.196 The U.S. Constitution grants 
Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”197 The 
main justification for establishing a copyright regime—giving 
stakeholders property rights, which are broader than the rights 
established by the contract regime—is based on the theory of law 
and economics. In short, providing stakeholders property rights 
promotes the creation of useful art.198 This, in turn, motivates the 
creators (or their transferees) to create, expose, develop, and 
distribute their works, enriching the total welfare of the public.199 The 
Copyright Clause, by securing exclusive rights to authors and 
inventors, aims to “promote the . . . science and the useful Arts.”200
This Section will focus on copyright law’s purpose of 
promoting the creation of artistic works by establishing an incentive 
structure through which authors are given exclusive control over the 
copyright works.201 Often, however, as a result of a special contract 
or relationship with the author or creator, other entities are entitled to 
the copyrights as direct transferees of the actual human creator.202
Unlike humans, AI systems do not need incentives to create 
artworks.203 It’s true that programmers need to be incentivized to 
196. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 60 (2005) (explaining how the society made an 
agreement with the authors to grant them exclusive rights for limited duration and 
then the rights become public domain).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201. See Posner, supra note 199, at 57; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017) 
(“Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 
(1989).
202. SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
WORKPLACE: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2013) (explaining the 
incentives to create as being part of the law and economics justification as well as 
other justifications for intellectual property); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the 
Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 
156 (2003).
203. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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create and develop advanced, automated AI systems, but 
programmers, or the entities for which they are working, do hold 
copyrights over the software.204 Once we understand the nature of 
incentives, we understand that they are nevertheless needed to (1) 
promote the development of AI systems’ programming and (2) 
encourage entities to control the functions of AI systems and to take 
responsibility for their outcomes. In these cases, ownership might be 
the most efficient tool for gaining this incentive.205
However, we do not need to incentivize robots or AI systems to 
function. Incentivizing AI systems to generate works they are 
already internally programed to create is pointless. My argument is 
rooted in understanding that automated AI systems not only evolve 
independently after the program has been completed, but also evolve 
in ways that are unpredictable, even to the human programmers who 
created them. This conclusion is further drawn from the fact that the 
connection and similarities that AI systems draw are neither made 
nor known to the programmers.206 We can compare this system to 
human perception via the human brain. The programmers 
implemented or created the neurons and synapses, but not the 
electronic messages that will be created in the future and their
products.207 The programmers thus create the systems, but cannot 
predict the works themselves.208 Consequently, the creativity of an 
AI system is not a result of the creativity of the programmers; at the 
very least, the causal relationship is not close enough to justify 
ownership (as a tool to incentivize a specific function) in the new 
works generated by AI machines.209 The human programmer is only 
ancillary to the creation of the artworks.
204. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 15.
205. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, 1243, 1243-48 
(1968) (arguing that ownership is efficient to retain property).
206. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2.
207. Julien Vitay, Helge Ü. Dinkelbach & Fred H. Hamker, ANNarchy: A 
Code Generation Approach to Neural Simulations on Parallel Hardware,
FRONTIERS NEUROINFORMATICS, July 31, 2015, at 1 (discussing a notable exception, 
the Brian simulator, “which allows the user to completely define the neuron and 
synapse models using a simple mathematical description of the corresponding 
equations [and] uses a code generation approach to transform these descriptions into 
executable code, [which in turn] allow[s] the user to implement any kind of neuron 
or synapse model”).
208. JAMES GLEICK, WHAT JUST HAPPENED: A CHRONICLE FROM THE 
INFORMATION FRONTIER 19 (2002).
209. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 18-19.
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In addition, and as mentioned above, programmers are already 
incentivized to make creative AI systems because they receive 
copyright protection for the program itself.210 Furthermore, because 
copyright protection does not exist in a vacuum, it must be balanced 
against competing rights. It is important that the legal regime 
incentivizes the right people and entities, and ultimately promotes 
behavior that will increase total welfare.211 The legal regime has 
succeeded if programmers who create AI systems are incentivized to 
do so either through intellectual property protection or patent 
protection for the machine, copyright protection for its computer 
code, or both. But if we understand that these legal tools incentivize 
the AI system or the programmers to create works of authorship, 
when they are not in fact doing so, the system is failing because it is 
inefficient. It should be obvious that machines need no incentive to 
work. In other words, assuming that machines capable of creating 
unique art already exist, in all likelihood there would be no need to 
incentivize the creation of these works. Providing AI systems with 
wires, electronic devices, Internet connection, and materials should 
be enough.
If, as the law and economics approach contends, copyright is 
meant to be an incentive structure, and machines do not need to be 
incentivized to create, then copyrighting the machines’ works 
provides no benefit but does hamper the public’s ability to enjoy the 
work.212 Thus, giving AI systems rights to the works they create 
would seemingly operate to take them out of the sphere of copyright 
altogether.213 Indeed, the public’s or the end-users’ interest in 
appreciating and enjoying works of art should be balanced against 
the private interest in maintaining exclusive, monopolistic control.214
Since human creators need to be incentivized to create, copyright 
used to be the optimal state of affairs for both parties because, 
without it, much fewer works of art would be created for the public 
210. See id. at 15.
211. Tiina Kautio et al., Assessing the Operation of Copyright and Related 
Rights Systems, CUPORE (2016), http://www.cupore.fi/en/research/previous-
researches/assessing-the-operation-of-copyright-and-related-rights-systems-142507-
14122016 [https://perma.cc/4BM3-SNCA].
212. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 7; see also
Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 29-30 (arguing that patent laws are not 
applicable in the 3A era of AI).
213. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 8.
214. See Julius Cohen, The Anti-Trust Acts and “Monopolistic 
Competition”: A Case Study, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 80 (1938).
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to enjoy.215 But in the non-hypothetical future in which machines can 
create pleasing works of art without limits, I argue that the existing 
balance would be thrown off. In the case of AI systems, I argue, 
there wouldn’t be any risk of a lack of artistic creation even if 
copyright law did not exist to protect such creations.216 Such a reality 
could, furthermore, pose an existential threat to the entire copyright 
regime.217
Assuming that many people consume works of authorship for 
their artistic merit, I argue it is likely that machine-produced works 
could not serve as a perfect replacement for human-authored works. 
Instead, the market for human-authored works of art would coexist 
with a market for works “authored” by machines.218 Since human 
artists would still need to be compensated, copyright law would 
persist, at least until machines capable of imparting deeper meaning 
to their work were created (if such a thing is indeed possible).219 In 
addition to being more likely in the near future, this model is perhaps 
more palatable to policymakers and the general public.
Thus, denying copyright protection for works of authorship 
created by machines is unlikely to greatly change the existing 
system. However, as the world becomes more electronically based 
and cyber-focused (a trend we can already observe), it won’t take 
long until machines, using AI systems, can copy any artistic work 
precisely (including the signature).220 This will ultimately destroy the 
215. See Jared Green, Why Public Art Is Important, DIRT (Oct. 15, 2012), 
https://dirt.asla.org/2012/10/15/why-public-art-is-important [https://perma.cc/T7NX-
E8PA].
216. See Moral Rights, ARTS L. CTR. AUSTL., http://www.artslaw.com.au/
info-sheets/info-sheet/moral-rights [https://perma.cc/8YNQ-67PA] (last visited Jan. 
15, 2018). Moral rights protect the personal relationship between a creator and his or 
her work even if the creator no longer owns the work or the copyright in the work. 
Moral rights concern the creator’s right to be properly attributed or credited and the 
protection of his or her work from derogatory treatment. See id.
217. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 19. See 
generally Tang, supra note 34 (explaining how the involvement of digital tools in 
creation leads to seeing moral right as trademark).
218. See Samuelson, supra note 129; see also Samuelson, supra note 166, at 
1148 (arguing that the role of the software programmer is crucial).
219. See generally Artificial Intelligence – Overview, TUTORIALSPOINT,
https://www.tutorialspoint.com/artificial_intelligence/pdf/artificial_intelligence_ove
rview.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4P-WVZB] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
220. See e.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Kenneth S. Kwan, 3D Printing the 
Road Ahead: The Digitization of Products when Public Safety Meets Intellectual 
Property Rights—A New Model, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 921, 923-24 (2017).
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incentive to produce these works of art, which, in turn, will 
eventually destroy the copyright regime.221
One possibility is that the AI systems might require electronic 
licenses, drawn up by electronic agreements,222 to use their products, 
as well as electronic contracts creating electronic sanctions for 
breaching the license (e.g., electronically terminating the infringing 
works).223 However, these methods would not need copyright laws, 
as the theoretical rights and their enforcement would no longer use 
the traditional court system.224 Although AI systems might be able to 
detect infringements easier and in more efficient ways, implementing 
copyright laws for the purpose of excluding other entities is not the 
right solution. Doing so would most likely lead to the loss of control 
and lack of accountability and responsibility that humans have over 
property and intellectual property rights.225
The thought of machines taking over and nullifying copyright 
law is not just far-fetched; it would also require a tremendous, 
uncomfortable shift in the legal landscape. After confronting the 
challenges posed by advanced technology and AI systems that 
autonomously generate works, it would be a stretch—even in the 
existing case of a sophisticated neural network AI capable of 
learning and creating independently—to imagine an AI system that 
could understand and use the copyright regime as its incentive. 
Furthermore, it seems non-feasible that AI systems will be capable in 
the near future of suing in court for ownership rights.226 I contend 
that, while preparing and formulating future laws, although 
theoretically and digitally feasible, it is not likely that AI systems 
will acquire ownership and sell or give licenses to use their products 
in the near future. I further claim that even when AI systems will be 
qualified to possess their own rights and duties, a more theoretically 
221. See id. at 927.
222. See Scholz, supra note 17, at 102. 
223. See id. at 110.
224. See id. at 120-21.
225. Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, supra note 220, at 924 (discussing the threat 
and hazards of 3D printings).
226. The decision earlier this month in the case of Halo v. Pulse will give 
owners of U.S. patents a greater likelihood of being awarded enhanced damages. See 
Frederic Henschel & Kevin M. Littman, U.S. Supreme Court Strengthens Patents 
(for a Change), SCIENCE BUS. (June 23, 2016), http://sciencebusiness.net/news/
79833/US-Supreme-Court-strengthens-patents-(for-a-change) [https://perma.cc/
UCX3-3WUP] (arguing this will raise the value of patents and increase the incentive 
to sue for infringement). 
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justified solution will be to legally impose these rights and duties on 
other parties as the users.
Instead, I would like to suggest an alternative model that, on 
the one hand, acknowledges and reflects the perception of the 3A era 
of automated, autonomous, and advanced AI systems, and, on the 
other hand, imposes control and accountability on traditional legal 
entities. This model would consider AI systems as employees (or 
contractors) that work for the humans or firms that legally operate 
them. This model is similar to the notion of an “employed creator” 
under the WMFH doctrine—i.e., an employee who creates new 
works in the scope of their employment.
The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right and may 
authorize others to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works 
based on the work, distribute copies of the work, or show the work 
publicly. Having those rights also means that the copyright holder 
has the right to stop others from infringing on those rights. The 
problem for a non-human, such as an AI system, is that it is unable to 
enforce those rights. Although it is theoretically feasible, a computer 
cannot sue another computer in court over the unauthorized copying 
of its work. Furthermore, a computer is incapable of transferring 
those rights to others who might be able to sue on its behalf. Even 
from a public policy perspective, the main purpose of granting 
copyright protection is to stimulate artistic creation by ensuring that 
nobody can steal the fruits of an artist’s labor, making it less risky to 
create original works of authorship. Since computers cannot be 
“encouraged” to create new works, the usual public policy 
justifications underlying copyright law are inapplicable.
Some would argue that the WMFH model isn’t any different 
from a film director and a cameraman taking particular shots. The 
cameraman is a creative person, but the director will hold the right to 
the shot. AI systems act similarly to the creative cameraman. In fact, 
in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
authorship requirement to include “any physical rendering of the 
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”227 The Court 
reasoned that, in most cases, in order for a computer to generate any 
kind of artistic work, it would require significant input from an 
author or user.228 Another way to think about it is this: when an artist 
uses Adobe Illustrator to create a unique graphic design, nobody can 
deny that the designs were the product of the designer’s creative 
227. 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
228. See id.
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mind. However, creating a song by pressing a button on a random 
number music generator isn’t going to receive copyright protection 
on the resulting musical composition. But if the user provides some 
input that affects the song being generated, such as choosing the 
instruments, deciding on the key or tempo, or choosing a musical 
style for the composition, then the final musical composition may be 
the result of creative input and therefore copyrightable.
The law and economics theory, discussed above, is the 
dominant justification for copyright protection in Anglo-American 
law.229 However, in continental Europe, where copyright protection 
originated with an eye towards protecting great, independent artists, 
a different approach prevails, as addressed in the next Section.
B. Personality and Labor Theoretical Justifications
In civil law jurisdictions, the dominant justifications for 
copyright are the personality and labor Lockean theories.230 The 
personality theory posits that copyright protection is a right that 
accrues to the author in possession, reflection, and development of 
his personality on the assets.231 It recognizes and appreciates the 
author’s accomplishments and the element of his or her personality 
and individuality that the work contains, rather than simply an 
incentive to create more.232 A related justification is the labor theory, 
which stipulates that copyright protection exists due to the hard work 
and dedication that authors contribute to their works.233 Just as AI 
does not need to be incentivized, AI systems do not have any need 
for recognition of the works reflecting their personality.234
Nevertheless, I argue that copyright protection could still accrue to 
the creators of such machines.
Developing AI systems capable of creating works of authorship 
is a great accomplishment. Therefore, it may make sense to grant 
229. See Posner, supra note 199.
230. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-
STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC
COPYRIGHT LAW 8 (2004); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and 
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 83 (1998).
231. See Hughes, supra note 230, at 83.
232. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 986 (1982) (arguing that the more personal one’s property is, the more 
nonfungible and nontransferable it becomes); see also Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 
191, at 9. 
233. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 191, at 4-5.
234. See supra Part III. 
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programmers the copyrights of works created by AI systems to 
recognize the magnitude of that accomplishment. Still, and even 
more strongly than the analysis of the incentive structure endemic to 
the law and economic theory, we have no other option than to 
recognize that when a creator is a machine, robot, or AI system, the 
personality theory and the labor theory are irrelevant. We therefore 
cannot justify the existence of copyright laws when they are applied 
to this new reality. Just as we do not need to incentivize 
programmers to create works of authorship in which they do not 
have any creative input, we do not need to recognize a programmer 
for an artistic accomplishment that is not his or her own. Therefore, 
there is little support for granting copyright protection to human 
programmers for the works of their AI systems under this theory 
either. However, when addressing the Work Made for Hire doctrine,
we can rely partially on the labor approach to the investment of the 
firm in the works produced by the AI systems.235
IV. THE MODEL OF AI—WORK MADE FOR HIRE (WMFH)
One major motivation for the proposed model is to unveil the 
clandestine interests behind the phenomenon of AI systems. 
Following Professor Jack Balkin, who has explored the “laws of 
robotics” and the legal and policy principles that should govern how 
human beings use robots, algorithms, and AI systems,236 I claim that 
we should view AI systems as working for the users, and hence the 
users should bear accountability for the systems’ production, in 
addition to the benefits thereof. Balkin argues that there exists a false 
belief of a little person inside each robot or program who has either 
good or bad intentions.237 According to Balkin, the substitution 
effect refers to the multiple effects on social power and social 
relations that arise from the fact that robots, AI systems, and 
algorithms act as substitutes for human beings and operate as 
235. See, e.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Amy Mittelman, Gender Biases in 
Cyberspace: A Two-Stage Model, the New Arena of Wikipedia and Other Websites,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 391 (2016) (explaining that 
investment into information technology can help establish a more free and 
democratic reality); see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “For a Mess of Pottage”: 
Incentivizing Creative Employees Toward Improved Competitiveness, CORNELL 
HUM. RTS. REV. (2013), http://www.cornellhrreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Incentivizing-Creative-Shlomit-Yanisky-Ravid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/88MX-T8WM].
236. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 14.
237. See id. at 13-14.
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special-purpose people.238 For Balkin, the most important issues in 
the laws of robotics require an understanding of how human beings 
exercise power over other human beings mediated through new 
technologies.239 The “three laws of robotics” should therefore be laws 
directed at human beings and human organizations, not at the robots 
or AI systems. According to Professor Balkin, those basic laws that 
regulate and control robots and AI systems include the following: (1) 
operators of robots, algorithms, and AI systems are information 
fiduciaries who have special duties of good faith and fair dealing 
toward their end-users, clients, and customers; (2) privately owned 
businesses who are not information fiduciaries nevertheless have 
duties toward the general public.240 I further argue that identifying 
the many players behind AI systems is the key factor for imposing 
accountability for the works generated by AI systems. Following 
Balkin’s argument, I propose a new model that might delegitimize 
the use of new technologies as a means for both public and private 
organizations to govern large populations. In order to unveil these 
hidden powers, I propose a model that sees AI systems as 
independent workers or employees of the users.
A. Rethinking the WMFH Legal Doctrine in the Case of AI Systems
The WMFH doctrine gives employers, or the individual 
commissioning the work, the copyright in works of authorship 
created by the employees or subcontractors.241 The WMFH rule is 
thus an exception to the general principle of copyright ownership. 
Usually, the copyright becomes the property of the author once the 
creation meets the demands of the law.242 However, if a work is made 
238. See id. at 14.
239. See id. at 16.
240. See id. at 19-23 (arguing that those who use robots, algorithms, and AI 
systems have a public duty to avoid creating nuisances. Thus, for example, 
businesses may not leverage asymmetries of information, monitoring capacity, and 
computational power to externalize the costs of their activities onto the general 
public).
241. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2010); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746 (1989); Works Made For Hire, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTA4-X44R] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2018).
242. § 102 (“Subject Matter of Copyright (a) Copyright protection subsists, 
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of 
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1)
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for hire, the employer or the one who commissioned the work would 
be considered the author, even if an employee or subcontractor 
actually created the work. The employer could be a firm, an 
organization, or an individual.243
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “work made for 
hire” in two parts:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to 
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an 
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if 
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the 
work shall be considered a work made for hire.244
This section should be read together with Section 201 of the same
Act:
(a) Initial Ownership.
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author 
or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of 
copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire.
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this 
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written 
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the 
copyright.245
The Supreme Court’s decision in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reed addressed the “work made for hire” definition.246
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic 
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic 
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. (b) In no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”).
243. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2 (“If a work is made for 
hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is the initial 
owner of the copyright unless both parties involved have signed a written agreement 
to the contrary.”).
244. § 101.
245. § 201.
246. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
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“The Court held that one must first ascertain whether a work was 
prepared by an employee or an independent contractor.”247 “If an 
employee created the work . . . the work will generally be considered 
a work made for hire.”248 In this context, however, the term employee
differs from its common understanding.249 “For copyright purposes, 
‘employee’ means an employee under the general common law of 
agency.”250 “An independent contractor,” on the other hand, “is 
someone who is not an employee under the general common law of 
agency.”251 “If an independent contractor created the work, and the 
work was specially ordered or commissioned,” the second part of the 
WMFH definition applies.252 “A work created by an independent 
contractor can be a work made for hire only if (a) it falls within one 
of the nine categories of works listed . . . above, and (b) there is a 
written agreement between the parties specifying that the work is a 
work made for hire.”253
To help determine who is an employee, the Court identified 
factors that establish an “employer–employee” relationship, as 
defined by agency law.254 The factors fall into three broad categories: 
(1) control by the employer over the work (i.e., the employer determines 
how the work is done, has the work done at the employer’s location, and 
provides the . . . means to create the work); (2) control by the employer 
over the employee (i.e., the employer controls the employee’s [time] in 
creating the work, has the right to have the employee perform other 
assignments . . . or has the right to hire the employee’s assistants); and (3) 
status and conduct of the employer (i.e., the employer is in business to 
produce such works [or] provides the employee with benefits).255
“These factors are not exhaustive[,] [and] [t]he Court left unclear 
which of these factors must be present in order to establish the 
employment relationship under the work-for-hire definition.”256
247. See id. at 731; Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
248. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 732; see also Works 
Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
249. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989); see also Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
256. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012); Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-52.; Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
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Examples of works made in an [employer–employee] relationship include: 
[a] software program created by a staff programmer within the scope of 
his or her duties at a software firm[;] [a] newspaper article written by a 
staff journalist for publication in the newspaper that employs the journalist 
. . . [;] [a] musical arrangement written for a music company by a salaried 
arranger on the company’s staff[;] [and] [a] sound recording created by the 
salaried staff engineers of a record company.257
Why it is important to identify WMFH? There are important 
consequences that stem from the WMFH doctrine, including that the 
term and duration of copyright protection differ, there are no moral 
rights, and the termination provisions of the law do not apply.258
B. WMFH and Works Generated by AI Systems
This doctrine is an important and major exception to the 
general rule that copyright protection properly rests with the one or 
the many who actually created the work.259 It is therefore important 
for cases of AI systems generating works.260 The Copyright Act 
named the employer and main contractor as the authors of the work 
even though they have not actually created the work.261 The policy 
rationale for this doctrine is to incentivize the employer or primary 
contractor at whose instance, direction, use, commercial purposes or 
risk the work is prepared, as well as to give them control over the 
commercial force regarding the work.262 The idea and the outcome is 
that the employer or primary contractor, rather than the creator (who 
is an employee or sub-contractor), has the responsibility for and the 
accountability over the actions of the creator in regards to, inter alia, 
257. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
258. §§ 101, 106A, 302(a), 302(c), 304(a), 203(a). For example, WMFH 
copyright protection of a work made for hire is ninety-five years from the date of 
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever expires first, whereas a 
work not made for hire is ordinarily protected by copyright for the life of the author 
plus seventy years. See id. § 302.
259. See § 201(a).
260. See Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interests’ from the ‘Fire of 
Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 
1131 (1998) (arguing that employees efficiently transfer their rights in future 
products to their employers through their employment contracts).
261. See § 201(b).
262. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746 (1989); 
Fisk, supra note 260. For a critique of this approach, see Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, 
Rethinking Innovation and Productivity Within the Workplace Amidst Economic 
Uncertainty, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 173-79 (2013) 
(rethinking innovation by incentivizing employees), and Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 
235, at 3.
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infringements of the law and harm caused by the work.263 This rule 
may be altered or changed by a contract among the relevant parties.
I claim that this doctrine seems to fit well conceptually with the 
problem of works created by AI systems. Although the AI system 
itself would be the proximate creator of the work, others, such as the 
user of the AI system at whose instance the work is ultimately 
created, will be entitled to ownership as well as accountability in 
regard to the works. But in the case of AI systems, who is the 
employer or main contractor? The answer may be complicated and 
may vary according to different circumstances. In many cases, it will 
be the user that operates and provides directions to the machine in 
the form of instructing it what to paint, write about, etc. The answer 
may also be the user that takes the financial risk of buying or hiring 
the machine and supplying it with energy and materials in the hope 
of producing a marketable final product. From a policy and practical 
standpoint, it makes sense to incentivize people or firms as well as 
other entities to use creative AI systems to create works of 
authorship because doing so will most efficiently promote the 
proliferation of the devices and the works they produce.264
The justification for giving the entitlement of ownership to 
economic entities is rooted in the incentive theory as well.265 This 
legally sanctioned monopoly allows the users to use, sell, or 
distribute the works more efficiently, as well as to be accountable for 
avoiding infringements and counterfeits.266 The latter is perhaps a 
better argument for giving copyright protection in the works of 
advanced, autonomous AI systems to their users. To avoid AI 
systems getting out of control, we have to legally nominate the most 
efficient entity to control them. The incentive for imposing property
accountability on the users as employers or main contractors and 
seeing AI systems as employees or subcontractors is not just 
intuitive, it is also justified by theoretical and practical reasoning. 
The user can also be the owner of the AI system when the owner is 
the more efficient entity for controlling these works.
263. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2012); Fisk, supra note 260, at 1131.
264. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 235, at 3.
265. Kendra Cherry, The Incentive Theory of Motivation: Are Actions 
Motivated by a Desire for Rewards, VERY WELL (May 9, 2016), 
https://www.verywell.com/the-incentive-theory-of-motivation-2795382 
[https://perma.cc/3JN7-P24S].
266. Paul Belleflamme, The Economics of Copyright Protection, IPDIGIT
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2013/10/the-economics-of-copyright-
protection [https://perma.cc/MGQ3-6QNW].
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This model also solves the inherent problem of multiple players 
being involved in the development of AI systems. The tragedy of 
multiple stakeholders is that they can block the development and
commercial use of the AI system.267 Moreover, the model would 
encourage further investment in the AI industry and likely promote 
science and technology, thus promoting the goals of the Constitution 
and promoting total welfare. With respect to AI systems, the 
innovation provided by this model does not just grant rights and 
benefits, such as ownership of the products, it also imposes 
responsibility and thus assists in solving the problem of the lack of 
accountability for the outcomes of AI systems. This mechanism 
might also contribute to the responsibility and accountability for the 
use of AI systems in other regimes, such as criminal law and tort 
law. One could argue that these fields are based on a different 
justification and, therefore, are not influenced by the copyright 
regime. However, I claim that, because AI systems are copyrightable 
based on their software, it may be justified and useful to implement 
this model within the intellectual property realm as it intersects with 
other legal fields, such as tort and criminal law, that address the same 
challenges, including lack of accountability for damages generated 
by autonomous car accidents caused by AI systems.
Under this model, we see the AI systems as creative employees 
or subcontractors (just like humans) working for these entities. The 
model works for both firms and humans: The autonomous AI 
system, just like WMFH-employed creators, is the creative author of 
a work. When an AI system acts autonomously, it can be compared 
to an independent contractor and thus be shielded under WMFH 
doctrine.
C. The Legal Implications of the AI WMFH Model
Who owns the copyright in regard to the works generated by an 
AI system? Who is responsible for any damage the works may 
cause? Who would be the most efficient player in distributing and 
selling the works? Take, for example, The Next Rembrandt project. 
Unlike a traditional computer program, The Next Rembrandt project 
had teams of people working for several years to bring it to the 
public. What happens to those individuals? Do all of the people 
involved with the project have copyright ownership of its artworks? 
267. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621-24 (1998).
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Are they all, or perhaps only some of them, entitled to joint 
copyright ownership? Trying to determine the scope of ownership 
amongst the team members would be extremely difficult. In fact, this 
multi-stakeholders challenge was one of the practical and theoretical 
issues that led to the original WMFH doctrine.
On some level, the AI WMFH doctrine can solve this problem. 
It holds that the person or entity that orders or initiates the work is 
entitled to the copyright, instead of the authors themselves. Based on 
this theory, before the AI system was generated, the employer or the 
main contractor may be entitled to all of the rights. However, does 
this mean that the employer or the main contractor, under certain 
circumstances, is also entitled to the right over the paintings 
generated by the AI system? If this were the case, for example, the 
entity that operates The Next Rembrandt project, ING, would receive 
the full copyright over the paintings being generated by the system, 
as soon as certain legal requirements were met.268 Thus, it is possible 
that there is a copyright in The Next Rembrandt and that the 
copyright is held by ING. Copyright protection is only important if 
ING wants to enforce it, and applying the WMFH doctrine in a case 
like this would have some drawbacks. 
D. The Drawbacks of Adopting the WMFH Model in Cases of AI 
Systems
Many questions arise in implementing the existing WMFH 
doctrine. Are the works generated by AI systems copyrightable in the 
first place? If these works are not copyrightable, can the employer 
hold copyright through the WMFH doctrine? What happens if the 
works generated by AI systems are not included in the nine-item list 
268. The requirements being: (1) A written agreement signed by both parties 
(2) that specifically states that the work is a “work-made-for-hire” and (3) the work 
must be one of these nine types: a contribution to a collective work, part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a supplementary work; a 
compilation; an instructional text; a test; material for a test; or an atlas. Generally, in 
order for the WMFH doctrine to apply when many individuals are involved in 
producing a work, the entity entitled to copyright ownership must sign a contract 
with each team member attesting that each team member’s contribution is a work 
made for hire. The type of work must also be included in the list of products covered 
by the WMFH doctrine. An argument could be made that The Next Rembrandt 
might fall under the category of “compilation,” or perhaps a “contribution to a 
collective work.” Additionally, it is very likely that ING, with potential copyright 
claims to the work, had to affirmatively relinquish any claims prior to starting work 
on the project.
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of the copyright law? What happens when autonomous AI systems 
create a work outside the scope of “employment”? What would be 
the legal outcome in another jurisdiction, such as France, where the 
creative employees retain the rights themselves? What would be the 
outcome when the AI system generates products or actions that are 
not copyrightable?
The Supreme Court has suggested that the WMFH doctrine is 
very limited in scope—namely, it applies only to instances where 
Congress has expressed a clear and explicit intent to override section 
102.269 Therefore, implementing the doctrine would require new 
legislation with a broader scope of the matters and the rights 
involved. By comparison, denying copyright to works produced by 
advanced AI systems would probably require judicial clarification, as 
such a result is theoretically compatible with the current legal 
framework.
Furthermore, the AI context is less germane to the Work Made 
for Hire analysis than a corporation, like a publishing company or 
record label. When addressing the works produced by AI systems, 
there are no human creators behind such production.270 The 
employed creators produce the protected works within the scope of 
their employment.271 These employees work for the employer mainly 
for the purpose of creating a work, with major contributions, 
guidelines, and involvement from the employer.272 The policy 
rationale for giving rights to these types of corporations is to justify 
the (often large) upfront costs entailed in developing artistic talent 
and slowly producing a work while balancing the needs of the artist 
with the needs of the corporation’s marketing strategy. However, the 
costs accruing to a user of creative AI would be much lower. For 
example, while a record company needs to scout and find talent, 
create a “brand” strategy for a musical act, allow the artist or artists 
to write and record music over several months, operate a music 
studio, and employ sound engineers to bring everything together in a 
269. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 747 
(1989).
270. See supra Section I.A.
271. Karthik Raman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Through 
Information Policy, UBIQUITY (June 2004), http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=
1008537 [https://perma.cc/Z5PF-6BJ4].
272. Employment Relations Research Series 123, DEP’T BUS. INNOVATION &
SKILLS (Mar. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/128792/13-638-employer-perceptions-and-the-impact-of-
employment-regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANR8-3K9L].
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finished song, the user of the kind of AI system discussed in this 
Article needs only buy the machine and supply it with materials. The 
machine can then create works non-stop, without needing to be 
compensated. Because the costs of undertaking the activity are 
relatively low, it may not make sense to create a new legal 
framework just to incentivize owners of creative AI systems. 
Therefore, some academics and practitioners argue that it might 
make more sense to adopt the personhood and rights of AI systems 
even if the “price” is simply refusing copyright protection.273
However, the model that I propose is broader than the WMFH 
doctrine and establishes a spectrum that might include all works 
produced by AI systems. 
E. The Advantages of the Proposed AI WMFH Model 
In this model, users are understood to be the owners of works 
generated by AI systems. As such, they are also considered to be 
responsible for such works. In this section, I discuss several benefits 
of this model, especially when compared to the alternatives. 
First, the model reflects an understanding of the human-like
features of AI systems, instead of ignoring them as current legal 
regimes do when they look for the human behind the system. The 
model refers to an AI system as both creative and independent and 
imposes the same set of rules and principles that regulate creative 
works produced by humans acting as self-contractors or during 
employment by others.
Second, the model is justified by the law and economics theory, 
which incentivizes the efficient use of the creative, autonomous AI 
systems and enhances the commercial force of the works generated 
by them.
Third, and most importantly, instead of implementing scenario 
A or B, which would hold programmers and other players to be the 
owners of the AI systems and entrust them with responsibility for the 
works generated, this model solves the accountability gap. The AI 
WMFH model is the best solution for the problem posed by the 
accountability gap because it places responsibility on the users as 
employers or main contractors of the AI systems. Seeing AI systems 
273. See generally Cohen, supra note 2; Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 
38 (suggesting an alternative model to patent law in case of AI systems generating 
inventions).
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as employed creators or independent contractors allows the legal 
system to control AI systems’ outcomes.
Fourth, instead of totally nullifying copyright laws as irrelevant 
and outdated, the AI WMFH model amends and accommodates parts 
of the existing doctrine. As a result, it better maintains legal and 
social stability.
Fifth, imposing accountability on users will encourage the 
careful operation of AI systems to avoid damages, infringements, 
and counterfeiting of third parties’ rights. The model identifies 
ownership as the main benefit of accountability. In this way, the 
model ensures the AI systems do not get out of control.
The users can be firms, individuals, states, governmental 
bodies, and more. The model is flexible. The accountability can be 
changed according to the specific circumstances. For example, 
damages caused by AI systems and actions or omissions of AI 
systems can be causally linked to other stockholders.
Implementing the AI WMFH model will require new 
legislation or adjusting the traditional laws, as current copyright laws 
are insufficient to deal with the advanced technology revolution. The 
model requires a fundamentally new component: recognition that 
works generated by AI systems are copyrightable even though they 
are not created by humans. 
The United States is not the only nation to have considered the 
effects that AI will have on copyright laws. Whereas U.S. law has 
faced some impediments towards establishing copyright protection 
for works created by AI, other countries have already taken 
preemptive steps towards clarifying this issue. For example, the 
United Kingdom took a stance with its 1988 Copyright, Designs, and 
Patent Act.274 The Act declares that human authorship is irrelevant to 
whether a work is copyrightable and that copyright in a work not 
authored by a human lies with the person who is responsible for the 
computer’s creation.275 Around the same time, the European 
Community considered the issue and applied an approach similar to 
CONTU’s. According to the European Community, since computers 
274. Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the 
United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the 
U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 238 (2006); Miller, 
supra note 54, at 1052 (arguing that existing case law contains no persuasive 
objection to extending copyright protection to works crated without a human author 
and that such an extension would fulfill the constitutional imperative of promoting 
progress in these areas).
275. Miller, supra note 54, at 1052.
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are currently the tool of human authors, the default approach to 
computer-generated works is to apply copyright protection.276
Although Europe had the added, thorny issue of moral rights, the 
result was ultimately the same as that adopted in the United States.277
Recently, the European approach has shifted more toward 
recognizing robots and AI systems as autonomous entities. One of 
the best examples of this approach is the draft proposal to impose tax 
payments on robots.278 The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) also discussed works produced by AI systems during the 
drafting of a proposed model copyright law and ultimately adopted a 
similar position as the European Community.279 More recently, 
Australian law has considered this issue in the context of deciding 
whether or not a copyrightable work must have a human author.280
Several Australian judgments seem to indicate that human authorship 
is required.281
V. U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW IS UNPREPARED TO DEAL WITH AI
SYSTEMS
A. Humans vs. AI Systems as Creators
The most significant hurdle to obtaining copyright control and 
accountability for a work generated by an AI system is the principle 
of human authorship.282 It is not clear whether the U.S. Copyright 
276. Id. at 1050.
277. Id. at 1049-50. 
278. See Weller, supra note 122.
279. Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property in an 
Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 465, 489, 497 (1994) 
(arguing that the TRIPS Agreements, even without suggested improvements, “marks 
significant progress in the quest for international intellectual property protection” by 
“balancing the demands of the industrialized nations for international intellectual 
property protection” and providing an “improved dispute resolution system with the 
interest of developing countries in achieving an agreement on agricultural and textile 
issues”).
280. Jani McCutcheon, The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated 
Works: A Critical Analysis of Recent Australian Case Law, 36 MELBOURNE U. L.
REV. 915, 938-40 (2012) (critiquing the application of conventional notions of 
human authorship to modern productions and suggesting alternative approaches to 
authorship that satisfy both the major objectives of copyright policy and the need to 
adapt to the computer age).
281. Id. at 939-40.
282. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 
(2008); see also Rebecca Haas, Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the 
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Act itself explicitly requires the author of a creative work to be a 
human.283 However, the U.S. Copyright Office, by publishing “The 
Compendium II of Copyright Practices,” has gone beyond the 
statutory text to require that an author be human in order for the 
work to be eligible for copyright protection.284 Although the 
Compendium is an internal document without the force of law,285 it 
reveals the attitudes of the Copyright Office and presents a 
significant hurdle for humans seeking to claim copyright protection 
in works not directly authored by them.
Consequently, integrating works produced by AI into the 
copyright regime will require at least the disturbance of settled 
Copyright Office practice. One must also determine whether that is 
the only hurdle that exists. For example, proponents of giving 
copyright protection to human users of AI-artists might look to 
Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra for support.286 In this Ninth Circuit 
case regarding the copyright of a holy text supposedly authored by
“celestial beings,” the court mentioned, in dicta, that the Copyright 
Act does not explicitly “require human authorship.”287 However, the 
case can also be interpreted as lending support for the idea that the 
statute really does not protect works authored by non-humans. For 
instance, the court muses, again in dicta, that “it is not creations of 
divine beings that the copyright laws were intended to protect.”288
Furthermore, the court required that “some element of human 
creativity must have occurred in order for the Book to be 
copyrightable.”289 In that case, the court determined that the requisite 
instance of human creativity was the compilation of the beings’ 
diverse revelations into a single volume.290
The works of current-generation AI systems, like e-David, are 
probably copyrightable because there is a connection between the 
creative elements and the users, such as the feedback supplied by 
Internet Age, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 247-48 (2010); Yanisky-
Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 19.
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 
958 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that copyright laws do not mandate humans to 
author the work).
284. THE COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT PRACTICES § 202.02(b) (COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE 1998).
285. Id. § 1902.07. 
286. See Urantia Found., 114 F.3d at 957.
287. Id. at 958.
288. Id.
289. Id. 
290. See id. 
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human trainers or the programming of a desired goal. But works 
created by totally autonomous AI systems, like an advanced neural 
network, probably do not meet the Maaherra standard, unless the 
human in question were to somehow alter the works, such as by 
compiling them together. Although that might be a sufficient remedy 
for owners of creative AIs, it does not foreclose the possibility that a 
single work, taken as it is, will not be copyrightable. To avoid this 
outcome, I suggest the adoption of the WMFH doctrine for AI 
systems, which considers the system to be the creative employee or 
creative independent contractor, thus entitling the rights to another 
entity to be responsible for the outcomes of the AI system.
B. Eligibility for Copyright Matters
Before determining the place artworks created by AI systems 
should have in our copyright laws, it is important to explore what 
place they presently occupy. Ultimately, all copyright protection in 
the United States is derived from, or at least related to, the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution.291 The Copyright Act, which is Congress’ 
implementation of that constitutional grant of power, provides that 
“[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”292 The Supreme Court’s formulation is that “[t]o qualify 
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author” and 
possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”293
The creator of a traditional work of art receives copyright 
protection automatically, as soon as the work is “put to paper.”294
New systems, like The Next Rembrandt, do not have a single 
artist.295 In such instances, the work itself was created by a digital, 
291. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
292. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (stating that copyright protection exists for any 
original works of authorship, in any tangible medium of expression, “from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and lists several 
categories of works of authorship, including literary works, musical works, and 
dramatic works, among others).
293. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 363-64 
(1991) (holding that information without original creativity is not protected by 
copyright).
294. See § 102.
295. See Ann Bartow, Copyright and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. &
T. J. 75, 96 (2004) (arguing that in the US copying style is not generally considered 
copyright infringement).
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rather than a human, creator.296 Can the computer or the computer’s 
owner assert a copyright?
To answer this question, one must apply the rules laid out in 
the Copyright Act. One must first determine whether computer-
generated art fulfills the basic requirements necessary to receive 
copyright protection.297 Copyright protection is currently available 
for (1) an original work of authorship, (2) fixed in a tangible 
medium, (3) that has a minimal amount of creativity.298 If a work 
does not meet all three of these requirements, then it is not 
copyrightable subject matter.299
1. Originality
An original work is one that is new or novel, and not a 
reproduction, clone, forgery, or derivative work.300 An original work 
stands out because it was not copied from the work of others.301 In 
another article, I have discussed the requirement of originality for 
works generated by AI systems.302 In that piece, I concluded that the 
formal approach to originality is preferred to the subjective approach 
and is applicable to works generated by AI systems.303 For example, 
at first glance, some may think that a work produced by The Next 
Rembrandt is an original Rembrandt. However, the AI system 
generated a new painting without copying any existing work even 
though it did copy the style of the original painter.304 Thus, as a 
unique image, it is likely that a work produced by The Next 
Rembrandt is an original work.
296. See SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 7 (2012). 
297. See § 102.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 2.
303. See id. at 53-56.
304. See STOKES, supra note 296, at 6; Bartow, supra note 295, at 96 
(arguing that in the U.S. copying style is not generally considered copyright 
infringement).
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2. Fixed in a Tangible Medium
The second requirement for copyright protection is the notion 
that an artwork must be “fixed in a tangible medium.”305 This means 
that the artwork must be more than just an idea in someone’s head.306
To be copyrightable, the work must have a tangible physical 
representation. Ideas are thus not copyrightable[;] only the execution or 
expression of those ideas [are copyrightable], which usually occurs once 
words are written on a page, paint is placed on a canvas, doodles [are] 
drawn on a napkin, or even an image [is] captured by the digital sensor of 
a camera or copied to a disk or cloud drive.307
In this case, the work produced by The Next Rembrandt is a 
physical painting, which is clearly a tangible medium, and thus it 
satisfies the second requirement.
3. Creativity
Even if a human inventor or user is not foreclosed from 
copyright ownership in the product of a creative AI system simply 
because the author is not human, there is still another hurdle to jump. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that, in order for copyright to apply to 
a work, there must be “at least some minimal degree of creativity” 
involved.308 Conceptually, we have to ask if the “creativity” of an AI 
system is really what the Supreme Court meant was required. It is 
widely recognized that the standard of creativity is extremely low.309
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit 
held that “[a] copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a 
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently 
distinguishable variations.”310 In the famous case of Feist 
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court 
made it clear that, although the standard of creativity is low, it is not 
305. See Yanisky Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 12 n.38.
306. See id. (explaining that to satisfy the second requirement, the work 
cannot just be “an idea in someone’s head”).
307. See id. 
308. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 363-64 
(1991) (holding that information without original creativity is not protected by 
copyright).
309. See id. at 345.
310. 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that in action for infringement 
of copyright, the eight mezzotint engravings were sufficiently different from the 
paintings which they purported to have copied and were thus entitled to copyright 
protections).
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non-existent.311 In that case, the Court found that a telephone 
directory was not copyrightable because it was nothing more than a 
compendium of facts, arranged in a commonsense way that revealed 
no creative input on the part of the creators.312 On cursory inspection, 
Feist may not appear to square directly with Catalda. If Catalda
stands for the proposition that anything, no matter how miniscule or 
inadvertent, that sets something apart from other works can supply 
the requisite creativity, Feist seems to say that something more is 
required. Although the phonebook was not identical to any other 
existing work, it was still not subject to copyright protection due to a 
lack of creativity.313
Indeed, much critical scholarship has been devoted to the 
proposition that Feist strengthened the creativity requirement. Prior 
to Feist, the copyright standards appeared to require little more than 
independent effort, and almost certainly did not require creativity.314
Those scholars posit that Feist is a reformulation, and almost 
certainly a tightening, of copyright restrictions.315 Indeed, Congress 
had earlier stated that the “standard of originality does not include 
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic [sic] merit, and there 
is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to 
require them.”316 Furthermore, the Register of Copyrights had been 
forced to abandon a standard that included a requirement that 
copyrightable works “must represent an appreciable amount 
of creative authorship.”317 But the Feist Court nevertheless held that 
their dual formulation of creativity and originality was 
constitutionally mandated.318 So, if creativity is logically distinct 
311. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345. 
312. See id. at 362.
313. See id.
314. Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 44 (1992) (arguing that the principle demonstrated by 
Feist is sound both doctrinally and in practice by “insisting that the constitutional 
requirement of authorship embodied in the standard of originality have some 
meaningful minimum”).
315. Id. at 5. 
316. Id. at 15 (quoting HR 1476 at 51; S. REP. NO. 473 at 50). 
317. See id. (quoting Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General 
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 9 (Comm. Print, 1961)) (recommending that the statue should hold that works 
must be tangible and “the product of original creative authorship” to be 
copyrightable, and “that these requirements apply to new versions of preexisting 
works”).
318. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347-48; cf. Abrams, supra note 314, at 
14.
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from originality, then the mere fact that an AI system’s works may 
be different from any that came before them will not be enough to 
secure copyright protection, either for the machine itself or for the 
owner of it.319 A court would have to determine that some creativity 
was involved in order for copyright to attach.320
It is difficult to pinpoint where exactly the element of creativity 
lies within a work created by a machine. It is a somewhat easier 
question with quasi-AI systems, like e-David, since the creators of 
such systems need to directly program all of the machine’s 
“creative” faculties. But with a hypothetical “learning” AI system, 
like a neural network, any creative output would be the result of a 
complex series of weights and calculations that human programmers 
can neither create nor understand. While it is obvious that such 
works can be “original,” in that they would not be identical to any 
other works, it is uncertain whether the creativity requirement adds 
anything more to the analysis. It may be that the process by which an 
AI system creates an original work is not “creativity,” which, as a 
term, has not been thoroughly explained by the Court. It may be that 
the distinction the Court made in Feist is little more than an attempt 
to prevent copyright from keeping compilations of plain facts out of 
public dissemination simply because they are not exactly the same as 
any other compilation.321 But it may just as well be the case that the 
creativity standard the Court articulated in Feist requires that innate, 
hard-to-define aesthetic sensibility that is, particular to living 
creatures. Such a definition of creativity presupposes an 
understanding of the concepts that are the subjects of a work. Even 
with advanced neural networks, it is difficult to foresee that such an 
understanding within AI systems would be possible anytime soon. 
Even if a machine could create a unique rendering of a subject, it is 
very unlikely that AI system would understand what that subject is. 
It thus lacks the type of internal comprehension that is generally 
reflected in the works of a human artist when they try to represent 
something more than the words on the page or the paint on the 
canvas.
The conclusion is that advanced technology systems, such as 
AI, which are capable of creating independent, creative, and original 
works, render the existing copyright regime unworkable. I have 
grounded the claim by discussing a few basic institutions within 
319. See Abrams, supra note 314, at 42.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 44.
Generating Rembrandt 725
copyright discourse that cannot be applied in the same way to 
machines as they can to humans. Based on this discussion, I have 
concluded that current U.S. legal doctrine on the subject of copyright 
for the works of AI is anything but clear. I have argued that there is 
no settled law on the matter. Further support for the notion that 
copyright should not subsist in works created by AI systems derives 
from the analysis of the goals of copyright law and the way in which 
the theoretical justifications for copyright protection interact with 
works created by AI systems. Therefore, I support amending the 
copyright laws and adding the tenth missing category—namely, the 
WMFH model that sees AI systems as independent contractors or 
employees and thus imposes ownership and accountability in regard 
to the works on the human users of such machines.
CONCLUSION
As the pace of digital advanced technology continues to 
accelerate and computers begin to achieve digital tools that I
formerly thought impossible, many fields are beginning to feel 
pressure. For example, in the auto industry, once one of America’s 
largest employers of factory workers, advanced robots are replacing 
humans in more and more aspects of the production process. These 
economic pressures are well known, but few have considered what 
the effects of advanced computers may be on the arts. Creativity, at 
least at the level necessary to produce works of authorship, is 
considered to be a uniquely human attribute. But, more and more, 
that presumption is being put to the test. Advanced AI systems like 
the robot, Ava, in the movie Ex Machina are already challenging our 
preconceived notions about the creative process itself. And this is 
just the beginning. So far, copyright law exists as long as there is still 
a human, or a team of humans, behind the art that these computers 
produce. However, the reality has entirely changed as AI systems 
have become able to create independently.
The technology has continued its forward march. Already, 
computer scientists have conceived of a machine capable of learning 
on its own and creating a work of authorship without a human 
supplying all the creativity. Consequently, copyright law needs to be 
changed or re-evaluated in order to determine how laws should 
address these AI systems, the products they produce, and the 
challenges they pose for the existing copyright regime. Policymakers 
have to create new moral boundaries for these systems in order to 
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avoid harm by imposing control of, and accountability for, AI-
generated works on recognized legal entities.322
The moment we understand how AI systems work, we realize 
that copyright laws are unprepared and irrelevant for AI systems. AI 
systems simply do not fit into the existing framework. In the United 
States and Europe, the traditional solution has been to look for the 
human behind the creative process, even when he or she does not 
exist, but this solution is untenable in the long run.
United States law does not speak on this subject directly. But 
certain legal doctrines exist that may act as impediments to granting 
copyright protection to works authored by machines. Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that the programmer, as one who has the rights to the 
AI system but is removed from the creative process of the 
independent, unpredictable AI system, will be responsible for the 
works generated by the system. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a 
work authored independently by a machine could be granted 
copyright protection for itself, as such a result would leave humans 
out of control and betray the justification on which the entire 
copyright regime is based. It is still possible to change the legal 
framework to accommodate these works, such as by implementing a 
new AI WMFH model, as I have proposed. This model can solve the 
accountability gap in regard to copyright law and even beyond the 
intellectual property arena.
322. Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics,” AUBURN,
http://www.auburn.edu/~vestmon/robotics.html [https://perma.cc/J3RJ-JW8W] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2018) (stating the Third Rule of Robotics: “A robot must protect its 
own existence”).
